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1. Introduction
Information systems enter the legal domain, slowly but steadily. They influence
the way information is found, documents are drafted, and decisions are made.
These influences can be examined from different perspectives. In this report, a
knowledge-theoretical perspective is employed. Knowledge theory or episte-
mology studies, among other things, the question under what conditions we may
call a belief  a piece of  knowledge.
From the early eighties onwards, knowledge-based systems and information
systems have entered the legal domain. Where expectations regarding the po-
tential of  such systems were raised to a high level in the beginning, optimism
gradually diminished until both the commissioner and the knowledge engineer
adopted a more realistic approach towards those systems. Instead of  the as-
sumption that computers could take over the role of  human professionals, it is
now often supposed that they merely support their users. Although most systems
are nowadays more properly called ‘information systems’, some of  the assump-
tions from the beginning still last, such as the assumption that it is possible to
represent legal knowledge in a computer.
Assume someone has to make a decision in a certain case. There are three rele-
vant items: the procedure that leads to a decision, the decision itself, and its
justification. These three items are interrelated; sometimes part of  the justifica-
tion is given by referring to the procedure. In the legal domain, justification is
important, because the acceptability of  verdicts depends on it. Where informa-
tion technology is used as a replacement of  part of  the task of, for example, a
judge, it is important that an acceptable justification is given, even if  a judge
would not give such justification. The confidence in judges who are assisted by a
computer may, if  necessary, be raised if  the justification of  their decisions re-
mains intact or becomes better.
There may seem to be an incongruity in imposing higher demands on a justifi-
cation given by a computer than on one given by a human being. Most people,
however, would still put more trust in the way a judge reasons than in a com-
puter producing a verdict. This is the case, even though we generally have no
idea how those decisions are attained. It is just that we have an inclination to-
wards putting trust in our congeners. Although this may be irrational on itself, it
is rational to take this situation as the starting point of  the investigation.
One of  the main reasons for the research that underlies this report is the un-
easiness caused by the introduction of  computer applications for all kinds of
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tasks. Recent developments tend to raise all kinds of  questions – ethical, practi-
cal, technical, legal – and some of  these have a philosophical nature. When
people have had more time to get used to those developments, some of  these
questions will be no longer relevant, or they will be answered by other disci-
plines. It is likely that information systems will establish a firm base in the legal
domain, and their functioning is no longer questioned. The use of  legal infor-
mation systems will become as common as the use of  codes of  law is now, and
the way the systems are built and used will no longer be a subject of  discussion.
But this will only occur when there has been a debate about these matters
among legal professionals and information scientists. In this report, I would like
to contribute to this debate by analysing the concept of  knowledge in the legal
domain, and use this concept to evaluate the way in which legal information
systems work.
1.1 Problem definition
Legal information systems are used for providing legal professionals with in-
formation on the legal domain, for the justification of  decisions, and for making
decisions. As such, they may be considered as a new source of  knowledge for
the law, i.e., they may provide someone with a new perspective on the content of
the law. Due to this observation, the problem definition of  this report is: to
what extent and under what conditions can legal information systems be con-
sidered as a source of  knowledge for the law? And: what are the implications of
the existence of  legal information systems for the demands that should be im-
posed upon legal justification?
1.2 Research goal
The goal of  this research project follows from the problem definition in the
previous subsection: to provide the means for analysing the belief-content of
legal information systems. These means should provide insight in the role legal
informations systems play in acquiring (legal) knowledge.
1.3 Research questions
To give an answer to the problem definition, the relation between beliefs and
knowledge in the legal domain has to be clarified. To attain this, the following
research questions will be answered. First, what types of  knowledge should we
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distinguish in the legal domain? Second, in the philosophical discipline of  epis-
temology, what criteria determine whether some belief  is knowledge? Third, are
criteria in the legal domain different from these? Fourth, what role can legal
information systems play in fulfilling criteria that transform belief  into knowl-
edge?
1.4 Structure of the report
In chapter 2, I give an introduction to legal information systems in general, and
I discuss the four systems taken as examples in this report. Chapter 3 covers
legal ontology, i.e., the object of  legal knowledge. This subject is discussed be-
cause an answer to the question how the law can be known cannot be given
without developing a view on the object of  knowledge in the legal domain. In
chapter 4, I discuss a typology of  legal knowledge, and different view on the
nature of  such knowledge. Chapter 5 is dedicated to regular knowledge. In
chapter 6, I discuss how knowledge criteria can be employed to transform legal
belief  into legal knowledge. In chapter 7, these criteria are employed to evaluate
the four legal information systems. In chapter 8, finally, I provide a summary of
the report and I draw conclusions.
The first research question, about the types of  knowledge to be distinguished in
the legal domain, is answered in chapter 4. The second research question, about
the criteria determining whether a belief  is knowledge, is answered in chapter 5.
The third research question, about knowledge criteria in the legal domain, is
answered in chapter 6. The fourth research question, about the role legal infor-
mation systems play in fulfilling knowledge criteria, is answered in chapter 7.
2. Legal information systems
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of general characteristics of  legal
information systems. In addition, it provides an overview of  four different legal
information systems. In section 2.1, I provide an overview of  the general fea-
tures of  such systems, and I discuss the legal tasks they may perform, and the
knowledge that users need in performing these legal tasks. In section 2.2, I give
an overview of  the goals, functions, and techniques that are encountered in IVS,
ESM, TESSEC, and LEDA. Finally, in section 2.3, I list some concluding remarks.
2.1 On legal information systems
Legal information systems perform different tasks. There are straight database
applications, offering information by executing queries. There are also systems
yielding a solution, given the answers to a number of  questions. The relevant
questions here are: is the output of  the system an advice or a decision? And: is
the output regarded as such, by the user or by a community?
Let me take a sentencing information system as an example. Assume that the
system says that in case of  a burglary a sentence of  two years on average is
given. A judge, who uses that system, takes this advice into account. However,
she also considers the fact that the perpetrator has performed a burglary before
(which could justify a more severe punishment), and that he has undergone
psychological treatment for kleptomania (which could justify a less severe pun-
ishment). The factors compensate for each other, the judge thinks, and she
sentences the perpetrator to two years of  imprisonment. The perpetrator knows
that the judge uses the information system. However, he does not know what
the judge’s considerations for the sentence are. He could obtain the impression
that the judge has followed the system blindly, and after he has spent his time in
prison, he has become a vindictive man.
In this example, the use of  an information system does not have the desired
result relative to the perpetrator. The success of  legal information systems partly
depends on the nature, proper use, and quality of  explanation of  its advice.
Normally we consider the relation between an information system and its users.
But in case of  legal information systems that affect society, the social accept-
ability of  the system becomes relevant. The social acceptability is partly deter-
mined by the assigned role or function of  the information system, and partly by
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its capabilities. An assessment of  an information system is thus not only a mat-
ter of  evaluating its capabilities, but also a matter of  taking notice of  the ways in
which it is used, and what interactions occur between the system and its users
(for a discussion of  proper use, I refer to the principles of  proper use of  infor-
mation technology, introduced by Franken, cf. e.g. Franken 1993).
In subsection 2.1.1, a typology of  legal information systems is given. In subsec-
tion 2.1.2, I provide an overview of  the legal tasks that may be performed by
such systems. In 2.1.3, I indicate what types of  knowledge users of  legal infor-
mation systems need.
2.1.1 A typology of legal information systems
In this report, the term ‘legal information system’ is used in a somewhat broader
sense than usual. I use it as a general term for the following categories of  sys-
tems (cf. Franken et al. 1997, p. 55-56):
· Systems that support administrative activities: word processors, financial
packages, etc.
· Systems for information retrieval: databases with legal information
· Knowledge-based systems that support problem solution or making deci-
sions: systems that take over a part of  some decision process
The boundaries among these categories are vague. The first category is not of
my concern in this report. The second and third categories are intertwined, in
that an information retrieval system can be used for the same purposes as
knowledge-based systems, namely structuring decision processes. An example of
the second category CD-ROMs with laws and regulations and a search function.
An example of  the third system is TESSEC, which structures the decision proc-
ess involved in social security law. An example of  a system that exceeds the
boundaries between the two is LEDA, which features both information-retrieval
and knowledge-based functions.
To which category a system is assigned is not only a matter of  its technical de-
tails and predefined functions. It is also a matter of  how the functions of  the
system are perceived by its users, and maybe even by the general public. A sys-
tem that is meant to provide only general statistical information on previous
decisions, but is perceived as giving advice on making decisions, is ‘made’ into a
knowledge-based system by its users. Thus, if  IVS (cf. subsection 2.2.1) were
used as if  giving advice on sentences, it would be employed as a decision-
making system, instead of  a decision-supporting system, giving advice to its
user.
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The systems described in this chapter are representatives of  the different goals
assigned to information technology. They have been selected on the basis of
two criteria: they should represent different lines of  thought concerning legal
information systems, and they should be thoroughly documented (all are de-
scribed in Ph.D. dissertations). All four systems have been built in The Nether-
lands. ESM resembles TESSEC in that they both work with production rules.
LEDA and IVS represent a different way of  approaching legal information sys-
tems. They support the user, merely giving advice, not making decisions. But
they perform this task in different ways. I refer to section 2.2 for a discussion of
the individual systems.
2.1.2 Legal tasks
In section 2.2, I will give an overview of  the tasks of  four legal information
systems. The tasks described there can also be typified in a more abstract way. In
this subsection, legal tasks are characterised through three general categories:
rule application, drafting, and systematisation. The first category regards the
tasks involved with the application of  legal rules to cases. The second category
regards the tasks that are connected to legal drafting. The third category con-
cerns tasks that are part of  the systematisation of  legal rules and cases.
Tasks that could be distinguished in relation to the category of  rule application
are (cf. section 3.3): rule identification (finding relevant legal rules, given a certain
case), classification (describing a case in terms of  legal categories), interpretation
(turning the relevant legal rules into rules that are applicable to legal categories
distinguished in the case description), and rule application (applying the inter-
preted rule to the classified case) (for the latter three tasks, cf. Hage 1997, p. 95).
Legislative drafting is constituted to a large extent by a number of  tasks that are
not legal tasks. These are not mentioned here. Legal tasks within the category of
legislative drafting are: isolating relevant legal preconditions with respect to the
domain of  legislation, isolating relevant legal preconditions with respect to leg-
islative drafting in general, and determining the legal goals of  the new legisla-
tion.
Systematisation consists of  finding systematical agreements among cases or
legal rules, and taking positive law to a higher level of  abstraction and unity. It is
more often a theoretical exercise than a practical one. It consists of  isolating the
criteria through which the systematisation is carried out, and determining which
rules conform with these criteria.
Legal tasks in the first two categories (rule application and legislative drafting)
are actually claimed to be performed by legal information systems (cf. section
2.2). These include, among other ones, rule application in TESSEC and ESM, and
isolating relevant legal preconditions with respect to legislative drafting in LEDA.
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2.1.3 A need for knowledge
What types of  knowledge do users need to perform legal tasks? We can derive
these knowledge types from the characterisation of  those tasks in the previous
section. Three categories of  tasks were distinguished: rule application, drafting,
and systematisation.
With respect to the first category of  legal tasks, users need knowledge about the
content of  legal rules, legal cases, legal goals, and legal principles. They need
knowledge about the interpretation and applicability of  rules, the classification of
cases, and the legitimacy of  goals and principles. And they need knowledge about
the methods by which they can interpret rules and classify cases.
With respect to the second category of  tasks, users need knowledge about the
content of  (legal) rules that apply to legislative drafting, and about the domain the
legislation applies to. They need knowledge about the validity of  the (legal) rules
that apply to legislative drafting. They also need knowledge about the method by
which they can perform legislative drafting.
With respect to the third category of  legal tasks, the user needs knowledge
about the content of  the legal domain in general, about the domain of  the sys-
tematisation, about the validity of  legal rules and systematisation criteria, and
about the methods by which systematisation criteria are applied, and the validity
of  systematisation criteria is determined.
From this enumeration, we can form a provisional typology of  knowledge:
factual knowledge about content, factual knowledge about validity, and factual
knowledge about method. The characterisation of  legal knowledge in legal in-
formation systems will be further scrutinised in chapter 7, after a discussion of
the object of  legal knowledge in chapter 3, a discussion of  legal knowledge in
chapter 4, a discussion of  regular knowledge in chapter 5, and a comparison of
legal knowledge and regular knowledge in chapter 6.
2.2 Four representative systems
In this report, the goal, functions, and techniques of  information systems are
evaluated. The goal of  a system is the purpose with which it was built; what
should be the effect of  its application? For instance, the system is meant to
assist in education, legislative drafting, interpreting legal regulations, or imple-
menting legal regulations (see also Quast 1996, p. 4). The functions of  a system
are the tools users have at their disposal when they use it. For instance, a system
has a search function that yields relevant case law. The techniques employed in a
system are the processes with which the system executes its functions. For in-
stance, a system may employ statistical techniques to compare cases.
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Goal and functions of  information systems are realised by employing different
techniques: the mechanisms used for providing relevant data and calculating
advice. The combination of  a certain goal of  the system with a certain function
may lead to undesired results. This is the case if, for example, a sentencing in-
formation system with a function of  information retrieval would be used as a
decision-making system.
In this section, I discuss four legal information systems: IVS (subsection 2.2.1),
ESM (subsection 2.2.2), TESSEC (subsection 2.2.3), and LEDA (subsection 2.2.4).
For each system, I provide an overview of what it is capable of, listing its goal,
its functions, and the techniques employed.
2.2.1 IVS
IVS (an abbreviation of  Informatievoorziening voor Straftoemeting) was devel-
oped by Oskamp and Schmidt (cf. Oskamp 1998) for supporting judges in sen-
tencing.
Goal: The goal of  IVS is to make visible the current sentencing practice in order
to help the judge sentence in an individual case (ibid., p. 14). The system is also
meant to reduce dissimilarities in sentences in similar cases, and thus to improve
equality of  rights. In its use, IVS serves three sub-goals. First, it is a general
means of  study for judges to enhance their knowledge of  sanctions imposed.
Second, it can be used as a preparation for the hearing (Dutch: onderzoek ter
terechtzitting), e.g., to collect the characteristics that are relevant for determining
a sanction and to use these as a checklist. Third, it is an aid during the decision
process regarding the sanction, when all relevant characteristics of  the case are
known (ibid., p. 164-165).
Functions: IVS makes available information concerning individual cases. This
information consists of  a description of  the case in terms of  relevant descrip-
tors, the sanction imposed, and the considerations that led to that sanction. The
information is searched for with the help of  relevant characteristics of  the new
case the user specifies. The system gives a measure for the agreement among
cases. It can also provide statistical information. On the basis of  the similarities
and dissimilarities among cases and the sentences imposed in those cases, the
user can decide on the sentence to be imposed in the new case. IVS has three
main functions: registration, selection, and maintenance.
The registration function enables the user to add new cases to the system. The
user of  IVS can use either of  two selection functions. The first function is a
statistical one. It makes a selection on the basis of  a limited number of  case
characteristics and yields an overview of  the bandwidth of  sentences imposed
(e.g., between 3 and 6 months of  imprisonment). The second fuctions regards
the content of  cases. It makes a selection on the basis of  a comparison of  rele-
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vant characteristics in the case at hand with the cases in the case file (ibid., p.
173). The results of  applying a selection function are either graphical represen-
tations of  sanction types and bandwidths given a number of  relevant character-
istics of  a case, or a list of  comparable cases whose characteristics can be
viewed individually. IVS never provides a suggestion regarding a sanction. It only
means to provide relevant data on comparable cases. The maintenance function
allows the users of  IVS to add and change data on cases.
Techniques: Both statistical and case-based reasoning techniques are used for the
comparison of  cases. The case-based reasoning technique employed is the k-
Nearest Neighbour algorithm (ibid., p. 130). This algorithm determines the similar-
ity between the given case and a case from the case file. It does so with the help
of  weights assigned to relevant characteristics, and an ordering of  those charac-
teristics. The model that serves as the basis for the comparison of  cases was
developed in accordance with the CommonKADS methodology. In Oskamp
(1998) emphasis is on the domain model and task model of  IVS. In these models
different entities, concepts, and the relations among them are represented. In
IVS, the domain and task models contain entities, concepts, and relations con-
cerning the domain of  sentencing.
2.2.2 ESM
ESM was developed by De Vey Mestdagh. This system is described in De Vey
Mestdagh (1997).
Goal: The primary goal of  ESM is to provide the user with a reconstruction of
the decision process underlying the issuing of  permits in environmental law.
The user asks the system to provide a conclusion, given a set of  data. She can
also ask the system to justify that conclusion by showing the underlying rules
and facts. Apart from this, ESM is a research instrument for testing hypotheses
on the representation and application of  legal knowledge.
Functions: ESM provides the user with five functions: facts, rules, save, explanation,
and how (ibid., p. 201-203). The facts function shows unchallenged data on cases
and on the domain in general. The rules function enables the user to perform
deductive inferences on facts and regulations. The save function enables the user
to establish data as facts. With new facts, the system can make more inferences.
The explanation function gives additional information on questions asked by the
system. The how function, on request, tells the user how a fact or conclusion
was derived. It does so by showing the source of  the fact, or the applicable rule
that leads to the conclusion.
Techniques: The inference engine behind ESM is based on the logic of  reasonable
inference. This is an adapted form of  first-order predicate logic, with an extra
notion of  semantic derivability. This notion, called reasonable inference, is based
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on the assumption that from a position, i.e., a subset of  statements within the
theory, valid inferences can be made. This enables us to reason from an incon-
sistent set of  premises. The usual notion of  semantic derivability enables us to
derive any statement from an inconsistent set of  premises, which makes it
(nearly) impossible to perform deductive inferences within the legal domain, as
the presence of  inconsistent premises is a characteristic of  the legal domain.
2.2.3 TESSEC
TESSEC is an expert system, meant to be an aid in the execution of  social secu-
rity law. TESSEC was described in Nieuwenhuis (1989). It was one of  the first
expert systems in the field of  legal information technology, and it still serves as
a means of  reference.
Goal: The goal of  TESSEC was to improve the quality of  decision-making by civil
servants implementing social security acts. It is observed that civil servants may
treat people differently under similar circumstances. This is partly the result of
the increasing complexity of  social security legislation (ibid., p. 13).
Functions: The expert-system shell used for TESSEC consists of  a screen that
contains questions, forms, explanations, conclusions or other data, depending
on the function currently selected. The main functions of  TESSEC are explana-
tion, proof, and why (ibid., p. 81-87). Other functions are forget, status, save, and
note. The explanation function gives information on the concepts used in ques-
tions the system asks (ibid., p. 81-82). The proof  function shows the production
rules applied to derive the conclusion, as well as the original legal rules. If  a
proof  consists of  multiple steps, each step can be made explicit by applying the
proof  function again (ibid., p. 82-85). The why function is meant to explain the
reason why a certain question is asked by the system. The system shows for
which rule it needs the answer to that question (ibid., p. 86-87). The forget func-
tion enables the user to revise a number of  answers to questions asked earlier.
The status function shows the values parameters currently have. The save func-
tion saves data in a client file. The note function allows the user to add addi-
tional information to answers (ibid., p. 87-88).
Techniques: The knowledge base of  TESSEC is built with the help of  production
rules. Production rules are if-then-rules containing the conditions under which
the rule applies, and the consequence of  applying the rule. It was attempted to
retain the structure of  the original legislation the production rules were based
on (ibid., p. 53). The production rules are evaluated through the backward-
chaining technique, which means that some goal (e.g., the answer to the question
what the amount of  the social security benefit is someone is entitled to) is the
basis for the questions that are asked by the system. A backward-chaining
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mechanism is more efficient when it comes to answering a specific question
(ibid., p. 79).
2.2.4 LEDA
LEDA supports the drafting process for regulations and laws. The Dutch Direc-
tives for Regulations (Dutch: Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving) contains direc-
tives that should enhance the quality of  new regulations. LEDA provides tools to
facilitate the drafting process and to provide easy access to the contents of  the
Directives (Voermans 1995, p. 93). Unlike the relatively homogenous function-
ality of  the previously discussed information systems, LEDA unites different
functions and techniques.
Goal: The goal of  LEDA is to make accessible the directives in the Dutch Direc-
tives for Regulations for a person who drafts a new regulation. In the different
stages of  the process of  drafting, LEDA provides the user with information
regarding structure and content. Also, it should provide the information re-
ferred to in the Directives themselves. Moreover, it is meant to provide knowl-
edge-based support for some sub-tasks of  the drafting process.
Functions: LEDA has two main functions, namely, providing information about
structure, and providing information about content. The first function reflects
the drafting process for legislation expressed in the Directives. The second
function reflects the content of  the Directives: it gives information regarding its
actual subject matter (ibid., p. 104-111). The structure of  the design process is
provided as an ‘information window’ in the word processor. Part of  the content
of  the design process can be executed through graphical schemas. The user can
always take notes (ibid., p. 108-109). The user is thus never forced into a deter-
ministic procedure, losing control over the design process. The content infor-
mation is provided in a static and a dynamic manner. The static provision of
information amounts to an extensive access to the content of  the Directives
(full-text search, abridged table of  contents etc.). The dynamic provision of
information amounts to the active support of  the user through pattern recogni-
tion. The system supports the user whenever certain keywords, or certain com-
binations of  words, are entered.
Techniques: The main technique used in LEDA is hypertext. A hypertext system
contains terms (words or sentences) that are linked to other terms or sentences.
The structure that constitutes the hypertext network is comparable to the
structure of  the Word Wide Web: a link connects the user to a different part of
the same text, or to a different text. Hypertext enables the user to navigate
quickly through a text, and it is therefore suitable to clarify the structure of, in
the case of  LEDA, the Directives. The hypertext representation of  the Directives
can be regarded as the static part of  knowledge representation. In addition to
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this, pattern recognition allows the system to find certain combinations of
words. Such combinations indicate that the text written by the user refers to the
contents of  the Directives.
2.3 Concluding remarks
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Types of  legal infor-
mation systems
There are three types of  legal information systems:
administrative systems, information-retrieval systems,
and knowledge-based systems.
Legal tasks Three categories of  legal tasks are distinguished: rule
application, legislative drafting, and systematisation.
Need for knowledge Users need factual knowledge about content, factual
knowledge about validity, and factual knowledge
about method.
IVS The goal of  IVS is to make visible the current sen-
tencing practice in order to help the judge sentence in
an individual case.
ESM The goal of  ESM is to provide the user with a recon-
struction of  the decision process underlying the is-
suing of  permits in environmental law.
TESSEC The goal of  TESSEC is to improve the quality of
decision-making by civil servants implementing social
security acts.
LEDA The goal of  LEDA is to make accessible the directives
in the Dutch Directives for Regulations for a person
who drafts a new regulation.
Table 2.1. Concluding remarks
3. Legal ontology
A discussion of  the epistemological aspects of  knowledge in the legal domain
should take into consideration the particular problems involved with the nature
of  the object of  legal knowledge. The philosophical discipline that considers the
object of  knowledge (i.e., reality) is called ontology. In this chapter, I pay atten-
tion to the nature of  the legal part of  reality. Legal ontology is a brand quite
different from ‘traditional’ ontology; its object is the law, and the existence of
the law depends, at least in some views, on the existence of  human beings.
Below, I subsequently discuss the main stances on the ontological status of  the
law (section 3.1), the relation between ontology and epistemology (section 3.2),
and a choice for a conception of  law, necessary to develop a view on legal
knowledge (section 3.3). Finally, I list some conclusions (section 3.4).
3.1 Theories about the ontological status of the law
Belief  and knowledge are usually about something. This means that there is some
state of  affairs to which a belief  is compared for the determination of  its cor-
rectness. But are there objects that the various entities we call ‘the law’ refer to?
One of  the issues in the natural law-legal positivism debate is precisely the on-
tological status of  the law: what are we talking about when we refer to rules and
norms? In my discussion of  natural law (subsection 3.1.1), legal positivism (sub-
section 3.1.2), and institutional theories of  law (subsection 3.1.3), I refer only to
general characteristics. These should suffice to indicate the ontological stances
they may induce. After comparing these claims (subsection 3.1.4), I sketch an
alternative picture, provided by Peczenik and Hage (1999), in subsection 3.1.5.
3.1.1 Natural law
Cliteur (1989, p. 363) characterises the natural law view by six items. First, there
is law that has absolute validity. Second, this law can be derived from human
nature or the nature of  reality. Third, human reasoning capabilities are sufficient
to know this law. Fourth, the validity of  positive law depends on the test of
content constituted by natural law. Fifth, positive law that does not pass this test
is invalid. Sixth, the test consists of  a set of  speculative and metaphysical ideas.
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These items contain an ontological claim, namely that natural law exists; it pro-
vides a framework for the assessment of  positive law (which may also be
claimed to exist, but whose existence status is less important than the existence
of  positive law). The validity of  positive law depends on the content of  natural
law. There is a direct link between morality and the validity of  the law. If  some
law is morally objectionable, i.e., if  it does not comply with the moral principles
embedded in natural law, that law is not valid.
3.1.2 Legal positivism
The legal positivist view is summarised by Brouwer (1997) in five features. First,
authority is the source of  the law. The validity of  a norm as a legal norm is
based on a human source. Second, the validity of  a legal norm does not depend
on the contents of  that norm, but on its presence within the legal system. Third,
there is no direct link between the law and morality. The question what is law
does not depend on what is morally justified. Fourth, legal norms have the high-
est authority; norms that are not recognised in the legal system are legally irrele-
vant. Fifth, the meaning of  a legal norm is a factual matter, not a moral one; it
refers to the goal the authorities aimed at with that norm.
An ontological claim compatible with these general characteristics of  legal posi-
tivism is that the law exists, i.e., positive law is valid whenever it is issued by a
sovereign power. The absence of  a direct link between morality and positive law
means that a morally objectionable law can still be a valid law. The only link
between morality and positive law is that positive law will often be based on
moral principles, and that interpretations of  positive law will also be influenced
by those principles.
3.1.3 Institutional theories of law
Institutional theories of  law give, according to Hage (1998), accounts of  differ-
ent themes in legal philosophy. However, they do have something in common,
namely their primary point of  departure. Institutional theories assume that legal
reality supervenes the world that consists of material facts. Legal reality, how-
ever, unites the factual and the normative in its supervenience (ibid., p. 141-142).
An institutional theory of  law consists of  a framework describing the relation
between brute facts and institutional legal facts. Brute facts are the object of
traditional ontology, institutional legal facts are claimed to be the entities gaining
existence through a system of  rules. These legal facts are the object of  legal
ontology. Below I discuss two institutional theories of  law. First, the institutional
theory of  law developed by MacCormick and Weinberger (1986, for a brief
discussion see Hage 1998, p. 131-133) claims that legal institutions, such as man-
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slaughter, property, and divorce, can yield institutional legal facts under certain
conditions. These facts are brought about or terminated by way of  institutive
rules and terminative rules. And by means of  consequential rules, their (legal)
consequences are defined. Institutional legal facts exist in time between the
point where they are established by an institutive rule, and the point where they
are abolished by a terminative rule. In the meantime, the consequential rules
hold for those facts. Legal rules themselves can also be considered as institu-
tional facts (cf. subsection 3.1.3).
Second, Ruiter (1993) proposes an institutional theory of  law. In this theory, he
emphasises the importance of  speech act theories (such as in Searle 1969) for
the establishment of  institutional legal facts. Ruiter’s theory covers the creation
and abolishment of  legal norms, based on the different types of  speech acts
distinguished by Searle. The idea is that a legal system can be analysed in terms
of  speech acts. These are acts that occur when people say certain things. For
instance, when a civil servant says ‘I hereby declare you husband and wife’ under
appropriate circumstances, these words have the result that the two people be-
fore her are married. Legal acts can be analysed in terms of  such speech acts. In
this example, the speech act implies a declarative legal act. A speech act can
succeed or fail. For instance, when the person performing the speech act has no
right to do so, the speech act fails. In that case, no legal act is performed (at least
not the one leading to a marriage). Or the speech act is performed by the proper
person, but the community in which the marriage has taken place, does not
recognise it. In that case, there is a legal act, but the necessary recognition of
that legal act does not occur. The validity of  legal norms thus depends on two
aspects; an ‘ideal’ aspect and a ‘factual’ aspect, where the former is achieved
through the proper performance of  legal acts, and the latter through social
recognition of  the norm (see Hage’s discussion of  Ruiter; Hage 1998, p. 137).
The ontological claim that can be attached to institutional legal theories in gen-
eral is that the law exists as supervenient on brute facts, and that the institutional
legal facts combine the factual dimension of  the law with its normative dimen-
sion (cf. Hage 1998, p. 141-142).
3.1.4 Comparing the claims
What is the difference between the ontological claims of  natural law, legal posi-
tivism and institutional theories? The existence claims apply to different objects.
Validity is taken to be a mode of  existence. Thus, where the term ‘validity’ is
used in the subsequent discussion, a special type of  existence is meant. Natural
law is something different from positive law. In a traditional natural-law view, the
existence claim applies to the law as an entity existing independently from hu-
man beings. The validity of  positive law depends on its conformity with natural
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law. Moral principles are interwoven with natural law, and thus, there is a link
between the validity of  law and the presence of moral principles. In legal posi-
tivism, the law is identified with positive law, and the validity of  positive law
depends on the sovereign power promulgating positive law. Institutional theories
of  the law make explicit ontological claims about legal entities: the law is re-
garded as supervenient on brute facts. Thus, the existence of  normative entities,
like norms, is given appropriate attention. However, by addressing the normative
dimension of  legal norms, one has not yet solved the problem of  the link with
morality. In their handling of morality, institutional theories of  law seem to
conform with legal positivism.
3.1.5 A conventional-cum-institutional approach
In Peczenik and Hage (1999), a conventional-cum-institutional (CI) theory of  law
is taken as a starting point for a discussion of  the ontology of  law. The final
approach adopted in the article is a coherence theory of  law, but the CI theory
fits in nicely with the need for a more precisely defined object of  legal knowl-
edge in this report.
The first concept that is adopted in the CI theory is supervenience. Hage (1998,
p. 128) defines supervenience as follows. A set of  characteristics A is superven-
ient relative to another set of  characteristics B if  there cannot be a difference in
set A without there being a difference in set B, while there can be a difference in
set B without a difference in set A. Thus, while the supervenient characteristic
(say, the colour red) can rest on different phenomena (a red sheet of  paper ver-
sus a white sheet of  paper illuminated by red light), the supervenient character-
istic is always the same when the set of  characteristics on which it rests remains
the same (a red sheet of  paper remains red).
The second concept adopted is conventional fact. The existence of  a conven-
tional fact rests on the conditions that a sufficiently large amount of  people
within the relevant community believes that fact, and also believes that everyone
believes that fact. In addition, the situation in which the relevant community
believes that fact is partly reason for the people belonging to it to perform ac-
tions. Those actions are meaningful because of  the existence of  the conven-
tional fact (adjusted from Lagerspetz by Peczenik and Hage 1999, p. 4).
The third concept adopted is institutional fact. An institutional fact derives its
existence from the following conditions. There should be a rule in the relevant
population, of which the conditions are fulfilled, and there is no exception to
that rule, and the conclusion of  the rule is that the fact exists (adjusted from
Lagerspetz in ibid.).
Together, conventional facts and institutional facts can account for the structure
of  a legal system. The definition of  an institutional fact is recursive. Conven-
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tional, institutional and brute facts may form an input to it, and conventional
facts and institutional facts may form an output. These facts may again form an
input to the definition of  an institutional fact. Rules, according to Peczenik and
Hage (ibid.) may be considered as facts. Thus, rules can exist, either as conven-
tional facts, or as institutional facts, or as both.
3.2 Ontology versus epistemology
Ontology regards the mode of  existence of  objects. Legal ontology thus con-
cerns the questions whether legal entities (such as norms and rules) exist, and in
what way they exist. Epistemology regards the question what knowledge is. Legal
epistemology thus is about the question what legal knowledge is. The link be-
tween legal ontology and legal epistemology is that the object of  legal knowl-
edge (the domain of  legal epistemology) is legal reality (the domain of  legal
ontology). I elaborate on the nature of  the object of  legal knowledge in subsec-
tion 3.2.1, and on certain specific parts of  this object, namely systematisations
and interpretations, in subsection 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Legal knowledge and its object
The object of  legal knowledge and legal knowledge itself  are hard to distin-
guish. To clarify this assertion, I discern four object categories of  legally relevant
knowledge (the object of  legal knowledge consists of  the latter three object cate-
gories). First, there are situations in the world that are relevant for the legal
domain. Examples of  this are: John hits a pedestrian with his car, Blair signs a
contract, and I buy a book. Second, there are sources containing statute law, case
law, and treaties, i.e., established legal regulations (formal sources of  law). Third,
there are systematisations and interpretations, made and used in legal practice
and legal theory, but not established as undisputed sources. For example, a sys-
tematisation of Dutch intellectual property law could be employed by a lawyer
for making his case, but it does not count as a formal source of  law. And fourth,
there are objects that are classified according to the law and thus acquire a legal
status. For instance, the fact that John hit a pedestrian with his car, is classified
as criminal negligence.
It is easy to distinguish the situation that John hits a pedestrian from the belief
‘John hits a pedestrian’. It is somewhat harder to distinguish the fact that some
law applies from having beliefs about the content of  that law. And it is even
harder to distinguish an interpretation from a belief  about that interpretation.
The reason for this is that interpretations are not objects in the same way as we
can regard toys as objects: we cannot hold, feel, and look at interpretations from
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different angles, while in the case of  toys, we can. We construct interpretations
ourselves, and by doing this we ‘make’ knowledge. At the same time we add
something to the world: a new interpretation, a new object. Whether an inter-
pretation is an object, and what kind of  object it is, depends on one’s ontologi-
cal stance.
3.2.2 Systematisation and interpretation
There exist different views in legal theory about the activities of  systematisation
and interpretation, and, consequently, about their ontological status. I subse-
quently discuss the views of  Aarnio, Peczenik and Hage, and Brouwer. Aarnio
(1987, p. 136) regards systematisation of  the law as a theoretical, scientific activ-
ity, while he regards interpretation as a practical activity, essential to legal prac-
tice. The object of  systematisations and interpretations, and their product, he
claims, are both (part of) the legal system (ibid., p. 136-137). The systematisation
activity classifies legal norms into different classes, according to some concep-
tual schema that has been prepared for that purpose. The interpretation activity
chooses an interpretation of  a specific norm from the realm of  possible inter-
pretations. Both activities make up legal reality. If  some systematisation or in-
terpretation remains unchallenged, this is not even problematic. But in many
cases different, competing and mutually inconsistent (or incoherent) systemati-
sations and interpretations exist for the same legal system and legal rules re-
spectively. This characteristic is essential to the legal domain, but it may threaten
the consistency of  legal reality.
In subsection 3.1.5, I discussed a conventional-cum-institutional theory of  law.
Peczenik and Hage (1999) embed this theory in a coherence theory of  law, in
which systematisations and interpretations are accommodated. Legal dogmatics
also connects the legal system ‘with its background in the form of morality and
(political) philosophy’ (ibid., p. 6). Thus, not only internal coherence (coherence
in the system of  legal rules), but also external coherence (coherence among the
legal system and its background) is aimed at. But what does such a theory say
about the existence of  systematisations and interpretations? Can there be a
correspondence between some belief  about an entity and the entity itself  (such
as a systematisation)? Or is a systematisation only established when it is intro-
duced and – maybe – believed by a certain number of  people?
It is claimed by Peczenik and Hage (ibid.) that a procedural theory of  law can
account both for knowledge of  the law and existence of  the law. Procedures can
be used to acquire knowledge of  the law by using those procedures for ex-
changing reasons for a certain opinion (for instance an interpretation). Thereby
we attain (a form of) justification for that opinion. Thus, contrary to the situa-
tion in which we have a justification for believing some brute fact, we have a
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justification for a procedurally constructed fact. In case we have a belief  about a
brute fact, the justification itself  does not influence that fact (as the fact is inde-
pendent of  our beliefs about it, and independent of  our justification for those
beliefs). In case we have a belief  about a procedurally constructed fact, the justi-
fication (the reasons we provide for the fact) constitutes – at least partially – the
existence of  that fact (cf. ibid., p. 9-10, Hage 1997, p. 30-31).
The systematisation of  positive law is, according to Brouwer (1998), an attempt
at rationality. The rationality consists in two demands. First, an individual legal
decision should be sufficiently justified. Second, together, the justifying reasons
for individual legal decisions should cohere (ibid., p. 1). Justifying reasons derive
their status from legal norms, and thus, according to Brouwer, one could also
say that legal norms should cohere. Systematisation, he claims, is a theory-laden
activity. Depending on the theoretical points of  departure, the criteria on which
the systematisation is based, may differ. Different aspects play a role in deter-
mining such criteria. First, the view on the elements present in the domain, that
are subject to the systematisation. Second, the relations among these elements.
Third, the demands that are deemed necessary to attain a well-ordered system
(ibid.). The systematisation activity thus partly depends on the view one has on
the ontology of  the domain: what are the elements in that domain, and what are
the relations among them? These are ontological questions prior to establishing
systematisations. What about the ontological status of  systematisations them-
selves? From Brouwer’s discussion, we may cautiously conclude that, insofar as
we can attach any ontological status to systematisation, it depends entirely on
ontological decisions made earlier, on a level below the systematisation.
On the nature of  interpretation, Brouwer (1997, p. 141) remarks that the
meaning of  a legal norm is given by the authorities responsible for establishing
that norm and/or modifying it. The meaning of  a norm is determined by the
rules of  language and the rules stating conventions for some of  these terms (the
meaning of  legal terms may differ from the ‘natural’ meaning of  the same term,
which is the case with terms like ‘murder’). In most cases, the meaning of  legal
norms is clear, and sufficient to determine whether it applies to a certain case. In
those cases where it is not, and a judge determines the meaning by filling in the
norm, he performs judicial construction, on the assumption that judicial construc-
tion starts where judicial application ends.
3.3 An ontological conception of law
In this section I introduce a system of  ontological claims regarding the different
elements in the law and those elements that are not part of  the law, but are
relevant to it. For the elements that should be distinguished, I use the two
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classes provided by Peczenik and Hage (1999, p. 1). The non-legal entities are
human beliefs, preferences, actions, dispositions and artefacts (the entities on
which the law supervenes). The legal entities are (valid) law, legal rules, legal
principles, legal values, and legal actions. In addition, I distinguish a class of
legal categorisations: interpretations, systematisations, and classifications.
The latter class arises from Hage (1997, p. 95-97), who claims that the essence
of  application of  law lies in a level of  abstraction where the conditions of  the
rule are on the same level of  abstraction as the facts of  the case. There are,
Hage claims, two processes at work to reach this state. First, legal sources are
interpreted to construct a rule of  law. Second, the facts of  the case are classified so
as to yield a classified case. As soon as we have a classified case and the rule of
law, the application of  the law amounts to simply applying the rule of  law to the
classified case.
The system of  ontological claims thus consists of  three layers. The first layer
consists of  non-legal entities. The second layer consists of  the legal entities
distinguished above. The third layer consists of  legal categorisations. The sec-
ond layer supervenes on the first layer in the way described in subsection 3.1.5.
The third layer supervenes on the second layer, but in a different way. While
entities of  the second layer exist through institutional or conventional rules,
entities of  the third level tend to have small institutional and conventional bases
– if  they have any at all. Only when such entities are institutionalised or become
a convention, they become part of  the second level. Thus, when an interpreta-
tion of  a legal rule is provided by a judge, and she classifies the case at hand
according to that interpreted rule, the resulting decision is valid law (as a prece-
dent), and it becomes an entity at the second level. As long as an entity is pres-
ent on the third level, its existence is merely constituted by reasons, where these
reasons are not widely accepted as being sufficient for its acceptance.
Choosing such an ontological position means limiting the possibilities there are
for taking an epistemological stance. Where, in the subsequent chapters, an
epistemological view is explained, the reader should realise that the content of
one’s epistemological view depends on the content of  one’s ontological view.
Explaining what legal knowledge is cannot be done without determining what
the object of  legal knowledge is. The ontological view explained here will be the
guiding line, but where the epistemological view discussed demands it (for in-
stance in the discussion of  hermeneutic theories of  the law), the corresponding
ontological claims will be different.
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3.4 Concluding remarks
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Theories about the
existence of  the law
There are different theories about the existence of
the law: in a natural-law view, existence (validity) of
the law is linked to morality; in a legal-positivist or
institutional view, existence of  the law depends on its
recognition by some proper authority. Besides this,
mutual belief  (convention) can play a role.
The relation between
knowledge about the
law and the law itself
Depending on the ontological stance taken, existence
of  the law is either independent or dependent on
human or authoritative recognition. Thus, knowledge
about the law is either about an independent object
or about a dependent object. In either case, knowl-
edge of  the law can still be distinguished from its
object.
Ontological commit-
ments
Three ontological layers are distinguished. The first
layer consists of  the non-legal entities. The second
layer consists of  the legal entities that exist through
convention or through an institutional rule. The third
layer consists of  legal categorisations that are made
by individuals, while they still lack existence through
convention or institutional rules.
Table 3.1. Concluding remarks
4. Legal knowledge
The concept of  legal knowledge is hard to define. To be able to give a definition
of  legal knowledge, we have to find out under what circumstances legal beliefs
qualify as legal knowledge, and what types of  legal knowledge exist. Each at-
tempt to define the concept of  legal knowledge is a provisional one, not only
because different persons define legal knowledge in different manners, but also
because its definition depends on the context in which the concept is used, and
on the type of  knowledge involved. Any proposal for definition of  legal knowl-
edge is thus tentative. This is the reason that such an attempt is also normative:
it prescribes the way we should regard the meaning of  legal knowledge.
In this report, the point of  view taken is epistemological, and the answer to the
question has a theoretical rather than a practical nature. Legal knowledge is the
category of  knowledge about legal entities. Legal entities are valid law, legal
rules, legal principles, legal values and legal actions (cf. Peczenik and Hage 1999).
Apart from legal knowledge itself, we may distinguish the category of  legally
relevant knowledge. This is knowledge that is necessary for making judgements.
Knowledge in the legal domain consists of  both legally relevant knowledge and
legal knowledge. The former type is a subset of  the category of  regular knowl-
edge, which is discussed in chapter 5. The latter category is discussed in the
current chapter.
Below, I discuss what types of  legal knowledge there are. I apply two restrictions
on my discussion. First, ‘knowing that’ is the main subject of  my discussion.
‘Knowing how’ is discussed only briefly as a part of  the typology of  knowledge
in the legal domain provided in this chapter. ‘Knowing that’ amounts to factual
knowledge, knowledge about what is the case. This type of  knowledge can be
made explicit. ‘Knowing how’ refers to intelligent skills we perform. We often
cannot make explicit this type of  knowledge. Insofar as we can make explicit
such intelligent skills, the specified procedures needed to perform them become
factual knowledge. The second restriction on my discussion is that it is limited
to the discussion of  a concept of  knowledge. I do not go into the matters of
knowledge acquisition and knowledge growth, although they are part of  episte-
mology.
In this chapter, the following subjects are dealt with. In section Error! Refer-
ence source not found., different types of  legal knowledge are listed. In sec-
tion 4.2, I discuss the matter of  judicial interpretation, and its relation it has with
legal knowledge. Next, in section 4.3, I provide an overview of  the characteris-
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tics of  hermeneutic theories of  law. Subsequently, in section 4.4, an overview is
given of  the epistemic claims for different stances in legal theory. Finally, in
section 4.5, I provide a typology of  knowledge in the legal domain.
4.1 Sources of legal knowledge
The term ‘legal knowledge’ refers to all knowledge that is about the law. In the
three subsections below, I clarify the sources of  such legal knowledge. First, I
explain the distinction between abstract and concrete knowledge (subsection
4.1.1). Second, I discuss the distinction between material and formal sources of
law (subsection 4.1.2). And third, I deal with knowledge sources for the law
(subsection 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Abstract versus concrete knowledge
Hage (1999) distinguishes between abstract and concrete legal knowledge. The
former category consists of  knowledge about valid law, legal rules, legal princi-
ples, legal values and legal actions. The latter category consists of  knowledge
about cases. These two types of  legal knowledge represent two sides of  a range,
between which the character of  an actual piece of  knowledge may vary.
The difference between abstract and concrete knowledge needs to be combined
with Ryle’s (1949) distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Abstract
‘knowing how’ is, for example, the competence to interpret legal sources. Con-
crete ‘knowing how’ refers to classifying cases. Abstract ‘knowing that’ is factual
knowledge about legal rules. And concrete ‘knowing that’ is factual knowledge
about classified cases.
‘Knowing how’ is about how to solve cases. ‘Knowing that’ refers to explicit
knowledge: what one regards as valid law can be expressed in language. ‘Know-
ing how’ is often implicit; few lawyers can explain how they solve cases. This
kind of  practical legal knowledge can still be made explicit to a certain extent, in
the form of  a reconstruction of  the procedure followed. Even though this pro-
cedure may not be an exact reflection of what actually happens (it may even be
completely different from that procedure), such a reconstructed procedure may
prove useful in learning the skills.
4.1.2 Formal and material sources of law
Sources of  law are the starting point for the acquisition of  legal knowledge.
Depending on the ontological stance taken, knowledge of  the law may be de-
rived directly or indirectly from sources of  law. The concept ‘source of  law’ is
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ambiguous. There is a distinction between formal and material sources of  law.
Formal sources of  law are, as some authors state (cf. Algra and Van Duyvendijk
1989, p. 19, also referred to in Bruggink 1990, p. 16), the knowledge sources for
the law. These are statute law, treaties, and legal precedents (ibid.). Customary law
is not considered as a formal source of  law in this report.
Material sources of  law are the origination sources of  law, i.e., the practical and
theoretical basis for the formal sources of  law. Material sources of  law do not
themselves amount to legal rules or legal norms. They form, however, the
grounds for those rules and norms. For instance, as soon as a judge has made a
decision in a case following customary law (considered as a material source of
law), she establishes a verdict from which we may derive a rule of  law (the ver-
dict, being a legal precedent, is a formal source of  law). Algra and Van
Duyvendijk (1989, p. 20) distinguish the following material sources of  law: po-
litical powers, civil servants, pressuregroups, religious beliefs, moral beliefs, so-
cio-economical developments, geographical circumstances, and technological
developments. The import of  this enumeration is that material sources of  law
are indeed the external factors relevant to the origination of  the law.
4.1.3 Knowledge sources for the law
Knowledge sources for the law are the sources through which we acquire
knowledge about the law. There are two dimensions in having factual knowledge
about the law: knowing its content and knowing its validity. As noted in the previ-
ous subsection, knowledge sources for the law are sometimes regarded as
equivalent to the category of  formal sources of  law. However, I would prefer to
make a clear distinction between formal sources of  law and knowledge sources
for the law.
In a legal-positivist stance, formal sources of  law largely coincide with valid law.
In such a stance, if  one acquires knowledge of  the formal sources of  law, one
will acquire knowledge of  both the content and the validity of  law. In a natural-law
stance, this is not necessarily the case; the validity of  law is determined by prin-
ciples that are not part of  the legal system. In such a stance, knowledge about
the content of  positive law is derived from the formal sources of  law, but
knowledge about the validity of  positive law is derived from principles outside
positive law.
In legal-positivist and natural-law stances, knowledge about the content and
validity of  the law may also be derived from material sources of  law. Material
sources of  law do not provide knowledge about valid law directly, but they are
helpful in interpreting the content of  formal sources of  law. Both formal
sources of  law and material sources of  law can thus function as knowledge
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sources for the law. Their precise role may differ, depending on the ontological
view of  the law taken.
4.2 Judicial interpretation and legal knowledge
In this section, the phenomenon of  judicial interpretation is discussed. The
main question to be answered here is: what is the relation between judicial inter-
pretation and legal knowledge? To put the question in different words: does
judicial interpretation establish legal knowledge, or does it establish something
else (something that exists, something with an ontological rather than an epis-
temic status)?
To be able to discuss this question, I first have to clarify the term ‘judicial inter-
pretation’. This term indicates to some extent what we see as the task of  a judge.
It can be opposed to judicial application and judicial construction (Scholten
1974, p. 7). Both judicial application and judicial construction rest on the as-
sumption that there is a clear distinction between legal rules on the one hand,
and facts on the other. Judicial application amounts to rule application; the ap-
plication of  legal rules in which the solution for a case can be found. Judicial
construction amounts to adjudication, to assess a case in normative terms with-
out a direct appeal to rules.
Scholten (ibid.) rejects the strict distinction between rules and facts. Instead, he
employs a view of  judicial interpretation in which the law does not only consist
in rules, but also in cases (for a discussion of  the ‘ius in causa positum’ principle
– the law is situated in the facts – see Smith 1998).
Is Scholten’s view a good starting point for a discussion of  judicial interpreta-
tion? It is a hermeneutic approach (cf. section 4.3), which provides a setoff  for
the often employed assumption that judicial interpretation amounts to the appli-
cation of  a rule to a case, thus enabling the deductive derivation of  a conclu-
sion. This assumption is not that naive in its own right: it can be worthwhile to
reconstruct the rule applicable to a certain case, to reconstruct the case so that it
fits in with the rule, and to derive a judgement from these. The naivety especially
applies to the assumption that such a reconstruction is not necessary, and that
simple rule application is sufficient for establishing a judgement. Though naive,
this assumption underlies much of  the work on legal information systems.
In this section, I discuss legal knowledge from the perspective of  judicial inter-
pretation. To start with, I deal with the difference between heuristic and legiti-
misation notions (subsection 4.2.1). Next, I discuss methods of  judicial
interpretation (subsection 4.2.2). Finally, I scrutinise the link between judicial
interpretation and legal knowledge (subsection 4.2.3).
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4.2.1 Heuristic versus legitimisation
In judicial construction, we may distinguish the actual way in which an interpre-
tative belief  is formed from the way this belief  is legitimised (cf. Bruggink 1990,
p. 57). How the belief  is actually formed, may remain unknown to us and even
to the person who forms it. The legitimisation is crucial for justifying the result
of  an interpretative process, and thus, important for the development of  a con-
cept of  legal knowledge. Explicit legitimisation can be communicated among
people. The qualification of  belief  as knowledge in this report is based on both
acquisition (by heuristics) and legitimisation: the knowledge criteria discussed
partly concern the way in which beliefs are formed, and partly concern how they
are justified.
Can the way in which judicial interpretation is actually performed be discerned
from the way in which it is legitimised? Does not the act of  interpretation pro-
vide an essential part of  the legitimisation of  its result? The answer to these
questions partly depends on one’s view on the ontological status of  the law, and
on the nature of  the legitimisation. The distinction between heuristics and le-
gitimisation is parallel to the distinction between descriptive and normative
theories of  interpretation. Descriptive theories are about what techniques are
actually employed to interpret, normative theories are about the ‘correctness’ of
an interpretation. An answer to the question is: insofar as we know how we
acquire an interpretation, the acquisition method may serve as a partial legitimi-
sation for that interpretation. Insofar as we do not know how we acquire an
interpretation, we have to rely on independent reasons for its legitimisation.
4.2.2 Methods of judicial interpretation
To indicate along what lines judicial interpretation can take place, I briefly dis-
cuss eight commonly distinguished interpretation methods (Pontier 1995, p. 26-
33). The grammatical or linguistic interpretation method aims at a close inspection
of  the literal text of  regulations. The meaning of  terms may be either inter-
preted following their ‘natural’ meaning (their meaning in normal, non-legal
use), or the meaning established by conventions in the legal domain. The system-
atical interpretation method calls upon the connection between the norm at
hand and the legal system it is part of. The agreement or relation with other
norms in the same legal system is central to the interpretation of  that norm.
The statute-historical interpretation method refers to the way the legal norm is
accomplished, i.e., it explains the meaning of  a norm by clarifying the historical
conditions under which the norm has been realised. The legal-historical interpre-
tation method does not refer to the history of  a specific statute, but to a more
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general historical context. This context can be provided by authoritative sources,
both legal (for instance, Roman law) and non-legal (general history).
The teleological interpretation method concerns the aim with which the norm
concerned was formulated. The idea is that not the literal content of  the norm
itself, but the goal which is expressed by it, is central to its interpretation. The
anticipating interpretation method applies to those cases where new regulations
are being planned, and the current legislation is explained partly in anticipation
of  those new regulations. The dynamic-evolutionary interpretation method takes
into account the way in which the explanation of  a certain norm has evolved
after it has been established. Not only its original goal, but also the way it has
been employed through the years influences its interpretation. Finally, the societal
interpretation method takes into account the social factors relevant to the inter-
pretation of  a norm. A legal norm, after all, has a connection with the society it
is part of  (Bruggink 1990, p. 109).
Not all of  these interpretation methods are used frequently, and they are not
mutually exclusive, i.e., multiple interpretation methods can be employed to
arrive at a single interpretation. Of  course, using multiple interpretation meth-
ods may also lead to different conclusions, thus complicating the interpretation
process. Although they are called interpretation methods, they are actually indica-
tive of  the sources that are used for interpretation. They do not describe or
prescribe the way in which a certain legal norm is interpreted. Rather, they de-
scribe or prescribe the source that is employed in the interpretation act, or the
direction in which the interpretation should be made. Thus, it would be better to
call them interpretation sources. Some of  these were listed earlier as material
sources of  law.
What about interpretation methods, then? Bruggink (1990, p. 57, 62-95) distin-
guishes between theories of  judicial interpretation as a process and theories of
judicial interpretation as a product on the one hand, and he distinguishes be-
tween descriptive and normative theories on the other. The two distinctions
yield four types of  theories. Descriptive theories about judicial interpretation as
a process can be constructed by doing empirical research on this process. De-
scriptive theories about judicial interpretation as a product are based on empiri-
cal research focusing on the product. One might, for instance, perform
quantitative analyses of  decisions. Normative theories about judicial interpreta-
tion as a process are for instance deductive and inductive theories, and herme-
neutic theories. Deductive theories start with looking at the rules, inductive
theories start with closely scrutinising the facts. Hermeneutic theories focus on
the interaction between rules and facts, and employ assumptions on the act of
understanding a person engages in when she performs an interpretation. Nor-
mative theories about judicial interpretation as a product are logic and argu-
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mentation theory. These give a reconstruction of  the logical inferences and the
argumentation lines for a certain legal statement.
Both distinctions (process vs. product and descriptive vs. normative) are impor-
tant with respect to a concept of  legal knowledge. Insofar as it relates to judicial
interpretation, the concept of  legal knowledge developed in chapter 6 concerns
interpretation as a product. Also, it is normative, as it says what criteria a belief
should comply with to become knowledge. But on closer inspection, it does not
seem possible to make such stringent distinctions. First, the product of  judicial
interpretation alone (which would amount to, for instance, a verdict), is not
really interesting without knowing either the way it has been established or its
motivation. And the way an interpretation is established may on its turn add to
its motivation. Second, a normative theory of  judicial interpretation is always
partially based on the actual process of  interpretation, i.e., such a theory does
never leave completely aside the reality it refers to.
The interaction between the product of  a process and the process itself  on the
one hand, and between the descriptive and the normative dimension of  such a
process on the other, leads to the following considerations regarding a concept
of  legal knowledge. Ideally, such a concept regards knowledge alone, thus not
taking into account the process by which the knowledge is acquired. Moreover,
it can be normative, in that it only regards what is deemed to be necessary to
turn belief  into knowledge. However, a concept of  legal knowledge should also
reflect essential parts of  the process of  acquiring knowledge. For instance, the
nature of  that process can count as a directive for establishing the applicable
knowledge criteria. A belief  arising from interpretation may be qualified as
knowledge under other conditions than a belief  arising from perception.
4.2.3 The link between judicial interpretation and legal knowledge
There is a connection between the notion of  judicial interpretation and the
notion of  legal knowledge. Knowledge about the result of  judicial interpretation
can be qualified as legal knowledge. However, whether all legal knowledge is
based on judicial interpretation depends on the conception of  law adopted. In a
natural-law view and a positivist view, our knowledge of  the law is not the same
as the law itself. In a strong natural-law view, the law is completely independent
of  any interpretation of  it. In a positivist view, what the law is depends on what
is recognised as such by the proper authorities. In a hermeneutic view, however,
what we recognise as the law is the result of  judicial interpretation. In such a
view the ontological category of  the law almost coincides with the epistemo-
logical category of  legal knowledge. The object of  legal knowledge is, in this
case, the result of  judicial interpretation.
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4.3 Hermeneutics in the law
The dominant theory about judicial interpretation in The Netherlands in the
second half  of  the 20th century has been Scholten’s theory (see section 4.2),
which is inspired by hermeneutics. This section provides an elaboration on
hermeneutic theories in the law. First, I provide some general characteristics of
such theories (subsection 4.3.1), then I discuss an example of  a hermeneutic
view, namely Dworkin’s theory (subsection 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Hermeneutic theories of judicial interpretation
Hermeneutic theories of  law form the main stream in legal theory. Having said
that, the differences among those theories are significant, and Dworkin’s theory,
discussed in the next subsection, is one with relatively few relativistic connota-
tions, i.e., the ontological and epistemological claims are stronger than one might
expect in a hermeneutic theory. In the discussion below, ontological and episte-
mological claims in hermeneutic theories of  law are discussed.
According to Smith (1997, p. 224), in hermeneutic theories of  the law, the law is
defined as an interpretation of  a practice. The practice is often a non-explicit
one. The interpretation should lead to an identification of what the law is. To
clarify the nature of  hermeneutics, I start with listing three distinctions that
cannot be held in such theories: there is no clear distinction between the de-
scriptive and the normative, between rules and facts, and between the law and
its interpretation.
The descriptive/normative distinction signifies the difference between what
there is and what there should be. To describe something is to list its character-
istics, while assuming that these characteristics are independent of  their charac-
terisation. To prescribe something is to say that something should be the case,
independently of  the question whether it is the case: there is a norm, with which
reality must comply. Hermeneutics says that such a distinction cannot be main-
tained, because we cannot describe reality independently of  some idea about
what reality should look like.
In a reflection on the law, the descriptive/normative distinction means that there
is no clear distinction between a rule of  a law and a fact it applies to, but that
there is an interaction between rule and fact, which yields a new characterisation
of  both the applicable rule and the fact. Brute facts, or facts that are not per-
ceived or interpreted by a human agent, can only be characterised meaningfully
in the light of  the rule, and the rule can only be formulated meaningfully in the
light of  the fact.
The third distinction, namely between the law and the interpretation of  the law,
is related to the second. However, in this case, we regard the law as being inde-
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pendent of  its application. The distinction between the two assumes that the law
exists, and that its interpretations are about that independently existing law.
Hermeneutics denies that this distinction can be made. In practice, the law is
only ‘found’ or ‘formed’ in its interpretations.
In case we interpret the law without referring to individual cases, we systematise
the law. Systematisation requires us to form an idea about the meaning of  indi-
vidual rules of  law and their connections with each other, finding out structural
distinctions and patterns. Systematisation cannot be seen as an activity that
leaves the original rules undisturbed. Instead, the systematisation activity is also
an interpretation activity that establishes the content of  the law.
Now that I have given a characterisation of  the distinctions that cannot be made
in a hermeneutic theory of  law, I give some properties of  such a theory with
respect to a concept of  knowledge. Knowledge about the world, or about the
law, is acquired through a form of  understanding (Verstehen). The subject/object
distinction – the distinction between the person who knows something and the
thing she knows something about – is denied. Before one can know anything,
one has to have some form of  knowledge about the world; one has to be a part
of  that world. Any acquired knowledge is related to the position one has in the
world; the knowledge that one has previously acquired. Thus, knowledge is
neither completely subjective, nor completely objective. The same is valid for
the meaning of  language. The language one uses is related to the particular
stance a person has in the world, and there is no objective relation between a
sentence and some part of  the world. Therefore, there is no such thing as ob-
jective truth either. The fact that all knowledge is the result of  interpretation,
and that this interpretation constitutes a part of  reality, means that an objective
distinction between a sentence and the fact that it is about cannot be established
(cf. Smith 1998, p. 68).
4.3.2 Dworkin: constructive interpretation
Dworkin gives an account of  interpretation in his ‘Law’s Empire’ (1986, p. 45-
86). This account is a hermeneutic one, roughly because it regards interpretation
as a constructive activity. Dworkin distinguishes among four types of  interpreta-
tion (ibid., p. 50-51): conversational interpretation, scientific interpretation, artis-
tic interpretation, and interpretation of  social practice. Conversational
interpretation occurs when we talk and listen to each other, and try to find out
what other persons mean. Scientific interpretation is deemed not to be pur-
posive, i.e., the raw data should speak for themselves, and the interpretation of
those data is led by their content. Artistic interpretation consists of  attempts to
discover the meaning of  a work of  art, which is projected in that work by the
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interpreter. The interpretation of  social practice covers legal interpretation. It
resembles artistic interpretation to the extent that it is about an object created by
human beings, but distinct from those human beings.
Thus, the types of  interpretation are defined relative to their objects: people’s
words for conversational interpretation, nature’s products for scientific inter-
pretation, people’s products for artistic interpretation and interpretation of
social practice. The agreement in object of  artistic interpretation and interpreta-
tion of  social practice leads Dworkin to accommodate them both under the
denominator ‘creative interpretation’ (ibid., p. 50). The question Dworkin asks
with respect to creative interpretation is whether it should be aimed at discov-
ering the author’s intention (where the term ‘author’ is meant to refer to anyone
creating something – be it a work of  art or a judgement), or by discovering the
‘best’ interpretation possible, regardless of  the author’s intention.
The interpretation of  social practice is an activity that scrutinises a case at hand.
It starts with a preinterpretive demarcation of what is the issue at hand: we have
to find out what are the rules and the standards that determine the content of
the practice to be interpreted (ibid., p. 65-66). Then the actual interpretation is
carried out, by isolating those arguments that contribute to distinguishing the
practice at hand (ibid., p. 66). Finally, in the postinterpretive stage, an attempt is
made to incorporate all deviant characteristics of  the practice into the interpre-
tation by adjusting it to those characteristics (ibid., p. 66). In my opinion,
Dworkin aims to express the view that the preinterpretive stage serves to isolate
the practice, the interpretive stage serves to construct the interpretation (where
the main direction of  reasoning is from interpretation to practice), and the
postinterpretive stage serves to ‘reconstruct’ the practice (where the main direc-
tion of  reasoning is from the practice to the interpretation, altering that inter-
pretation if  necessary).
Most notable in the view Dworkin has on interpretation, is that he rejects scep-
ticism. Interpretations can be ‘right or wrong’, even ‘true or false’ (ibid., p. 78).
Although he adheres to a constructive type of  interpretation, where the inter-
pretation does not necessarily reflect the intentions of  (members of) a commu-
nity, he claims that one interpretation can be better than another. According to
Dworkin, there are two sceptical stances: internal scepticism says that there is no
way to determine whether one interpretation is better than another, in fact, there
is no way that an interpretation can earn priority over others, because no actual
interpretation provides the unity required for such an enterprise (ibid., p. 78).
External scepticism, instead, makes an ontological claim, namely that there is no
way to test the correctness of  an interpretation, as there is nothing in reality it
can be tested against (ibid., p. 79-80). Dworkin emphasises that many sceptic
attacks to claims on priority relations among interpretations (one interpretation
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is better than another) employ externally sceptic arguments, but make internally
sceptic claims. But the claim that there is no independent reality to which inter-
pretations can be checked is quite a different claim from saying that no inter-
pretation can be deemed better than another (ibid., p. 83). Dworkin does not
challenge the former claim, but he does dispute the latter one.
4.4 Epistemic claims in legal theory
Epistemic claims in the legal domain depend on the ontological status of  the
legal entities. The ontological status of  legal entities, on its turn, depends on the
view one has on the nature of  the law. A brief  review of  some of  the leading
views in legal philosophy was given in section 3.1. The main epistemological
question is: given the supposed existence of  certain legal entities, can we know
them? In case of  a natural-law view, the epistemological claim is that abstract
‘knowing that’ of  natural law, i.e. abstract factual knowledge of  legal norms, is
possible. Concrete ‘knowing that’ can be established through knowledge of  legal
norms and knowledge of  cases (knowing a case in the light of  the legal norms
that apply). A claim about abstract ‘knowing that’ of  positive law is not made,
but we may assume that such knowledge can be acquired. Whether positive law
is really valid law, can be known by testing positive law against natural law. This
test consists of  checking whether the content of  positive law complies with the
principles expressed in natural law. Claims about concrete ‘knowing that’ and
concrete ‘knowing how’ are not made and are difficult to reconstruct.
In case of  legal positivism, abstract ‘knowing that’ of  valid law is possible
through knowledge of  sources of  law and knowledge of  their recognition as
such by the proper authorities. Concrete ‘knowing that’ is possible through
knowledge of  valid law and knowledge of  cases. For ‘knowing how’, the same
remark can be made for legal positivism as for natural law: explicit epistemic
claims are not made. For institutional theories of  law, the same epistemic claims
can be made as for legal positivism. The existence component is elaborated on
in such theories through institutiona rules. In the conventional-cum-institutional
theory of  law, conventions may also add to existence.
Hermeneutic theories have a different approach towards knowledge. The dis-
tinction between knowing that and knowing how is somewhat vague in such
theories. In the hermeneutic view, knowledge is always the product of  an inter-
action between the subject and the object of  knowledge. Therefore, factual
knowledge (knowing that), and a competence to do something (knowing how),
are both partially based on knowledge that was already present. The epistemic
claim that can be made about legal knowledge in general is that such knowledge
is always dependent on the background knowledge one has. Legal knowledge
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cannot be acquired without some sense of what the legal domain amounts to.
The process of  acquiring such knowledge is a circle in which new knowledge is
assessed from the perspective of  the knowledge that is already present.
4.5 Typology of knowledge in the legal domain
In the current section, I give an overview of  the different types of  knowledge
discussed in this chapter. Three distinctions have been made (all applicable to
the legal domain). The first is between factual knowledge (‘knowing that’) and
practical knowledge (‘knowing how’). The former type refers to knowledge that
can be expressed in the form of  propositions. The latter type refers to knowl-
edge that is ‘internalised’ in a person: a skill one has, a competence to perform
some act. The second distinction is between abstract knowledge and concrete
knowledge. Abstract knowledge is about abstract items, such as rules. Concrete
knowledge is about actual items, such as cases. The third distinction is between
legally relevant knowledge and legal knowledge. Legally relevant knowledge is
knowledge about non-legal items that are relevant to performing legal acts or
processes. Legal knowledge is knowledge about legal items. In table 4.1, differ-
ent objects of  legal knowledge are classified according to these three distinc-
tions.
Knowledge typology Legally relevant
knowledge
Legal knowledge
Factual
knowledge
about
· material sources of
law
· moral values
· formal sources of  law
· interpreted formal
sources of  law (legal
rules)
· legal norms
· legal principles
· legal goals
· legal values
· systematisations
Abstract
knowledge
Practical
knowledge
· interpret material
sources of  law
· interpret and apply
moral values
· interpret formal sources
of  law
· systematise sources of
law
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Factual
knowledge
about
· factual aspects of
cases
· classified cases
· legitimisations of
decisions
Concrete
knowledge
Practical
knowledge
· assess factual aspects
of  cases
· draft legislation
· classify cases
· legitimise decisions
Table 4.1. Typology of  knowledge in the legal domain
4.6 Concluding remarks
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Formal and material
sources of  law as
sources of  legal
knowledge
Formal sources of  law are those sources that have an
official status within the legal domain as sources of
law. Material sources of  law are those sources that may
contribute to the understanding and interpretation of
formal sources of  law. Both types of  sources may
contribute to knowledge of  the content and validity of
law.
Judicial interpretation A discussion of  judicial interpretation should distin-
guish between the process of  interpretation, the result
of  that process, and the legitimisation of  the result.
Judicial interpretation
versus legal knowledge
Depending on our ontological stance with respect to
the law, the result of  judicial interpretation may be an
object of  legal knowledge: in legal positivism, it is (if  it
is an authoritative interpretation), in natural law, it is
not.
Hermeneutic theories
of  law
In hermeneutic theories of  law, the object of  knowl-
edge cannot be clearly distinguished from the knowl-
edge itself. Therefore, the knowledge one acquires
about the law partly constitutes the law.
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Epistemic claims Epistemic claims made by various theories of  law
directly relate to their view on the ontological status of
the law. In a natural-law view, knowledge of  the law is
attained through knowledge of  positive law, and the
degree to which it is in accordance with the principles
of  natural law. In a legal-positivist view, knowledge of
the law is attained through knowledge of  the content
of  positive law and knowledge of  its validity.
Typology of  knowl-
edge in the legal do-
main
A typology of  knowledge in the legal domain is made
according to the following distinctions: legally relevant
versus legal knowledge, abstract versus concrete
knowledge, and factual knowledge (‘knowing that’)
versus practice. (‘knowing how’).
Table 4.2. Concluding remarks
5. Regular knowledge
The focus of  this report is not on general epistemology, but on legal epistemol-
ogy. However, regular knowledge, the subject matter of  general epistemology, is
sometimes legally relevant. This is the case when it adds to knowledge of  the
law. Therefore, in the current chapter, regular knowledge is discussed as well.
Legal knowledge differs from regular knowledge. First, the object of  legal
knowledge differs from the object of  regular knowledge. Second, the acquisition
methods for legal knowledge differ from the acquisition methods for regular
knowledge. Legal epistemology is about the legal domain, and the legal domain
contains elements whose ontological status is disputed (cf. chapter 3). Acquiring
legal knowledge also differs from acquiring regular knowledge, in the sense that
we read texts, listen to statements, and interpret rules to acquire legal knowl-
edge. And if we investigate our surroundings in order to be able to give a legal
classification for a certain case, we do this by carefully following legal guidelines.
When we regard legal knowledge, we should also take into account regular
knowledge. Regular knowledge forms part of  the foundation for legal knowl-
edge, as legal judgement is partly based on knowledge about facts. Legal knowl-
edge, in the context of  this report, is a concept that covers knowledge of  the
law as an object. Legally relevant knowledge covers the knowledge that is neces-
sary to apply legal knowledge. In this chapter, the subject of  regular knowledge
is tackled. Legally relevant knowledge is a subset of  regular knowledge. First, in
section 5.1, I introduce the main concepts and questions in general epistemol-
ogy. Second, in section 5.2, I discuss five different knowledge criteria. Third, in
section 5.3, I indicate how these knowledge criteria can be combined in a con-
cept of  knowledge. In section 5.4, finally, I summarise the findings of  this
chapter.
5.1 An introduction to epistemology
Though legal epistemology differs from general epistemology, there are many
concepts that we encounter in both disciplines. One of  the basic concepts is
‘belief ’. A belief  is an explicit conviction of  a person about some state of  af-
fairs. For instance, when a judge sees some piece of  evidence, she may think:
‘that piece of  cloth is evidence’, or ‘that piece of  cloth is going to play a crucial
role in my decision’. Other concepts employed in both disciplines are knowledge
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criteria, such as truth and justification (though their precise meaning may differ,
depending on whether they are used for general or legal knowledge).
Epistemology is a philosophical discipline that deals with questions about
knowledge and belief. These questions address the acquisition of  knowledge, its
justification, and its growth (cf. Bradie 1989, p. 396). The acquisition problem
concerns the way we acquire our beliefs, as opposed to the way we should acquire
our beliefs. The way beliefs are acquired may influence the status of  such be-
liefs: it can be a factor in determining whether beliefs are knowledge. The justi-
fication of  knowledge concerns the ways in which we can defend our beliefs:
when does a belief  become a piece of  knowledge? The growth of  knowledge is
a typical problem of  philosophy of  science: in what sense does our knowledge
grow? In other words: while science evolves, is there anything that serves as a
landmark for progress or growth?
In figure 5.1, the topics of  epistemology are arranged as follows:
object of  knowledge ® (true) belief
acquisition
¯ justification
knowledge
¯ growth
accumulation
of  knowledge
Figure 5.1. Topics of  epistemology
The central question in this chapter is: which criteria should be fulfilled to call a
belief  a piece of  knowledge. There are different criteria that may apply. In the
next section, I discuss truth, justification proper, reliability, consistency, and
coherence. These can be combined to provide different definitions of  knowl-
edge. Not all of  these criteria can always as easily be distinguished from one
another. In some views on epistemology, for example, the coherence criterion
constitutes justification, so that they cannot be regarded as two separate criteria.
Epistemologists tend to bring up new arguments to ensure that a problem, once
it has been discovered, remains a problem. The problem of  knowledge is one of
these. Just when virtually every philosopher in the Anglo-Saxon tradition was
convinced that knowledge was some kind of  justified true belief  (cf. Audi 1998,
p. 214), Gettier (1963) showed it was not. Consensus has been rare ever since.
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The basis for a piece of  knowledge is a belief. A belief  is a conviction of  a per-
son about something, the object of  the belief. Truth can either be regarded as an
epistemic or a non-epistemic criterion. When it is regarded as an epistemic crite-
rion, the truth of  a belief  depends on the presence of  evidence or an opinion,
i.e., on epistemic factors. When it is regarded as a non-epistemic criterion, the
truth of  a belief  depends on the relation between the content of  that belief  and
the nature of  reality. Epistemic factors, like our evidence for the belief, are not
relevant in this case. In the former case truth can be manipulated by humans
(insofar as our evidence for a belief  can be manipulated), in the latter case truth
is independent of  human interference. Justification proper is the part that should
make probable, or prove, the content of  the belief. Justification proper of  a
belief may consist of  (1) a proof, for example a proof  in case of  a mathematical
proposition, (2) giving good reasons for a certain belief, or (3) exchanging argu-
ments, leading to an agreement of  opinion on a certain belief. Reliability amounts
to the degree of  trust we can put in our cognitive apparatus to yield correct
beliefs. Consistency concerns the absence of  contradictions in a set of  beliefs.
Coherence concerns the degree to which the individual beliefs in a set can be
inferred from other beliefs in the same set. The reader finds a more extensive
discussion of  these criteria in section 5.2.
A definition of  knowledge, for example in terms of  the criteria listed above, is
usually embedded in a more extensive theory of  knowledge, as such a theory
forms the basis for the definition. Knowledge theories provide us with the an-
swers to epistemological questions like the ones mentioned at the start of  this
section: (1) how do we acquire knowledge, (2) how do we justify knowledge, and
(3) how does knowledge grow. The first step in answering these questions is
asking where belief  and knowledge come from: what are the sources of  belief
and knowledge? In subsection 5.1.1, I discuss this question. In subsection 5.1.2,
the distinction between doxastic (belief-based) and non-doxastic epistemic theo-
ries is clarified. And in subsection 5.1.3, I explain the different between inter-
nalist and externalist epistemic theories.
5.1.1 Sources of belief and knowledge
A belief  source is the process or phenomenon that a belief  is based upon. A
knowledge source is equal to that, except that in this case a piece of  knowledge
arises from the process or phenomenon. Audi (1998) distinguishes five sources
of  belief  and knowledge: perception, memory, consciousness, reason, and tes-
timony. First, through our perception, we acquire beliefs about what we see,
smell, hear, and feel. In most (but not all) cases, our senses provide an accurate
picture of  the world we live in, and on the basis of  that accurate information we
form correct beliefs. Second, we may not at present use this information, but
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preserve it for later use in our memory. When we recall beliefs stored earlier, or
base new beliefs on whatever we stored earlier, we use memory as a source of
belief. Third, often, we are conscious of what we are doing and of what we are
thinking. This characteristic enables us to reflect on what we are doing and
thinking. These reflections are themselves a source of  belief, called conscious-
ness. Fourth, reason is a source of  belief. Our intelligent skills enable us to pro-
duce beliefs that are not directly based on other sources, but whose truth is
somehow ‘obvious’ to us, or can be proved, for example mathematical theses.
Fifth, we often acquire beliefs on the basis of  something other people tell us.
We need not experience or prove everything ourselves, we may also base our
beliefs on what other people, or products of  other people, tell us.
This brief  overview gives an idea of  how we acquire beliefs. Extensive literature
is available on most of  these belief  sources. An introduction is given in chapter
1 through 5 in Audi (1998). I restrict myself  to a discussion of  the characteris-
tics of  belief  sources relevant to the legal domain, given the assessment of  legal
information systems as a knowledge source. I give an example to clarify the
application of  the belief  sources from traditional epistemology to legally rele-
vant knowledge.
Assume that there is a case in which five persons play a part: a judge, a plaintiff,
a suspect and a lawyer, and a witness. The suspect has supposedly stolen a car
radio. The plaintiff, who says the suspect has committed theft, questions the
witness. She is – obviously this is a very cliché scenario – an old lady wearing
thick glasses. She says that she saw the suspect – she points at our suspect, Mr
Fish – breaking a window of  a car and stealing the radio.
The lawyer questions the witness as well. She asks her if  she actually saw the
suspect steal a radio. The witness hesitates. ‘Well, I saw him removing something
from the car’, she replies. The lawyer turns out the lights in the courtroom. She
shows a device to the witness, from a distance of  60 feet. ‘This is how far you
were from the actual scene’, she says, ‘could you please identify this device?’.
The lady gazes at the device. ‘Is it a radio?’, she asks, hesitating. ‘No’, the lawyer
responds, ‘it is a small briefcase, belonging to Mr Fish’.
In this example, various belief  sources have entered. The witness has used
memory as a belief  source, and the memory was originally based on perception.
But to what extent plays memory a role? She may never have formed the belief
that the witness stole a car radio until she was asked whether the witness stole
such a device. She has seen something, but she based her answer on a ‘suggestive’
question about the witness. So, apart from memory, she based her answer on a
belief  stemming from testimony (the suggestion arising from the question ‘was
he the person who stole a car radio?’), and from reason, deducing the conclusion
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that the man took a car radio from the premises that she saw the man taking
something from the car, that the police told her that it was a car radio, and that
what the police tells you is true. She may even be tempted to question her own
memory after the lawyer’s demonstration, and to try to assess the reliability of
her memory by some kind of  introspection.
The brief  analysis shows that all five belief  sources are employed in the acquisi-
tion of  legally relevant beliefs.
5.1.2 Doxastic versus non-doxastic theories
According to Pollock (1986), there are currently two main divisions for knowl-
edge theories: doxastic versus non-doxastic theories, and internalist versus exter-
nalist theories. They are useful to classify the different knowledge criteria that
are discussed in this chapter, and I therefore discuss them briefly. In this sub-
section, I explore the difference between doxastic and non-doxastic theories. In
the next subsection, I discuss the distinction between internalist and externalist
theories.
Doxastic theories tell us that beliefs are ultimately justified by other beliefs, i.e.,
the justification of  a belief  is always attained by relating it to other beliefs. In
doxastic theories beliefs are related to each other to form a chain or net of  justi-
fication: a justification that is constructed for a certain belief  can be grounded
by a final (basic) belief  or by linking it in a system of  (coherent) beliefs. Non-
doxastic theories tell us that some other element comes in, so that the justifica-
tion of  a belief  can ultimately be given by something outside the realm of  be-
liefs. In a non-doxastic theory a justification can e.g. be given in terms of  the
reliability of  the mechanism that acquires the belief.
The category of  doxastic theories has two main representatives: coherentism
and foundationalism (Pollock 1986, p. 19-21). Coherentism says that a belief  is
justified by its place in a ‘net’ of  beliefs. The relations among beliefs determine
whether one of  them is justified. The criterion of  coherence itself will be dealt
with in subsection 5.2.5. All beliefs have the same status; there is no class of
beliefs that is ‘basic’ and is suitable for starting a justification chain, such as in
the case of  foundationalism. Foundationalism assumes that the chain of  justifi-
cation stops at one or more basic beliefs. These basic beliefs are beliefs caused
by our perception of  the external world. They should be justified themselves,
for if  they are not, the chain of  beliefs that is based upon them will not be justi-
fied. Thus, the status of  basic beliefs differs from the status of  other beliefs.
The category of  non-doxastic theories has three main representatives: direct
realism, reliabilism, and probabilism. These are discussed in the next subsection.
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5.1.3 Internalist versus externalist theories
A different categorisation of  knowledge theories is internalist versus externalist
theories (Pollock 1986, p. 21-25). Internalist theories state that a justification is
always given in terms of  the internal states of  a person. These internal states are
present in our cognitive system, and they can be beliefs or signals from our
senses. Not all signals we get from that machinery are conscious. And even if
they are conscious, they need not yield explicit beliefs. Audi (1997, p. 12) adds to
this that internalist theories claim accessibility of  these internal states for intro-
spection: the belief-justifying internal state is accessible for the person who has
the belief.
Foundationalism and coherentism are internalist theories (they are thus inter-
nalist and doxastic). An internalist non-doxastic theory is direct realism. Direct
realism is the view that some judgements about the world are not beliefs about
that world, but that they are perceptual states, directly caused by the outside
world (ibid., p. 91). Thus, there is no mediation of  perceptual judgements by so-
called perceptual basic beliefs (which are presupposed by foundationalist theo-
ries).
Externalism amounts to all views where other elements than mere beliefs and
internal states are relevant to justification. So, if  justification is made dependent
on the general reliability of  one’s cognitive system, an externalist view is em-
ployed: the tendency of  one’s cognitive system to yield correct beliefs is deter-
mined from an external viewpoint. Externalist theories do not adhere to the
doxastic assumption, because ultimately, justification is not given in terms of
beliefs. Externalist theories evaluate cognitive procedures from an external
viewpoint, so that it can be forecasted under what circumstances those proce-
dures yield reliable beliefs (ibid., p. 23-24). Examples of  externalist theories are
probabilism and reliabilism. Probabilism explains epistemic justification in terms
of  the probability of  individual beliefs, while reliabilism explains epistemic justi-
fication in terms of  the general reliability of  a cognitive mechanism that yields
those beliefs (ibid., p. 105).
Section 5.2 serves to explain the criteria that can be employed to define regular
knowledge. In the discussion of  some of  these criteria, the reader will find a
further explanation of  some of  the epistemological theories discussed above.
5.2 Knowledge criteria
In this section, I discuss five knowledge criteria. These criteria are employed to
assess beliefs. In a concept of  knowledge, such knowledge criteria are used to
decide whether a belief  is knowledge. I deal with truth (subsection 5.2.1), justifi-
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cation proper (subsection 5.2.2), reliability (subsection 5.2.3), consistency (sub-
section 5.2.4), and coherence (subsection 5.2.5).
5.2.1 Truth
One of  the criteria that make a belief  into a piece of  knowledge is truth. Truth
can be regarded either as an epistemic criterion or as a non-epistemic criterion.
In the former case, truth is a functions of  the presence of  a justification for a
belief. The truth of  a belief  then depends, for instance, on the presence of
good reasons for that belief. An example of  a candidate for replacing the truth
criterion is coherence: we may claim that if  all beliefs we have cohere, this will
constitute some kind of  truth. A different epistemic conception of  truth is
rational acceptability. In Putnam’s (cf. Alston 1996, p. 189) definition, it is idealised
rational acceptability. The latter amounts to a view in which there is coherence
among beliefs and beliefs constituted by experience. A belief  is true when it
corresponds to the representation of  our experiences in the form of  other be-
liefs.
As a consequence of  identifying truth with some epistemic criterion, the truth
criterion easily becomes empty. So, for instance, when we identify truth with a
sufficient justification, we may as well drop the notion of  truth. But if we make
the truth of  a belief  dependent on the fulfilment of  several different epistemic
criteria, for instance justification and coherence, truth can be a useful predicate.
Non-epistemic truth criteria are independent of  our knowledge. They belong to
the realm of  semantics (the theory of meaning), which is about the relation
between language and reality. This means that the truth of  a belief  does not
depend on the belief ’s relation with other beliefs. Instead, it only depends on
the belief ’s relation with reality. The main representative of  the category of
non-epistemic truth criteria is correspondence truth (i.e., the correspondence
theory of  truth). Correspondence truth says that for a sentence to be true, it
should be in accordance with a situation in reality. As correspondence truth is
non-epistemic, the truth of  some sentence should not depend on our conceiv-
ing of  it as being true or not. The truth of  a sentence can be postulated, but it
can only be backed by giving reasons or proof  for it. Truth can also be estab-
lished in case of  statements about a constructed part of  reality. So, after a soccer
game, won by the Dutch team by 1-0, the statement ‘one goal was scored in this
game by the Dutch team’ is true. To know this, we still have to employ epistemic
means. Thus, even with sentences about social reality, we have to know that
reality before we can make (supposedly true) statements about it.
What does correspondence truth amount to? I give a slightly adapted definition
from Devitt (1991, p. 29):
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A sentence is true or false in virtue of: (1) its structure; (2) the referential relations between its
parts and reality; (3) the objective and mind-indepe nt nature of that reality.
The first part of  this definition refers to the syntactic structure of  the sentence
under consideration. The second part concerns the referential relation between
sentence parts and reality. The third part concerns the nature of  reality: reality
exists independent of what we believe about it. Together these elements mean
that a sentence like ‘The cat is sitting on the mat’ is true whenever this sentence
has the meaning that the cat is sitting on a mat, and there is indeed a cat sitting
on a mat. The definition given does not include the existence of  things and
categories of  things that are dependent on the mental. To put this constraint on
correspondence truth is to exclude the possibility of  determining the truth of
sentences containing mind-dependent facts. This is an unnecessary deficit.
In my view, truth is an idealised semantic notion, not an idealised epistemic
notion. This means that the question what is true is completely independent
from the question what can be justified. There are statements of  a certain lan-
guage that are true but are not proved (yet). Still, we can hold that such a state-
ment is true or false. The fact that there is not any proof  for it need not
withhold us from leaving open the possibility of  assigning a truth-value to it.
An idealised, non-epistemic notion of  truth, as presented above, has a major
disadvantage. If  we succeed in separating epistemic considerations from seman-
tic ones, i.e., if we separate the relation between knowledge and reality from the
relation between language and reality, our epistemology should be such that it
enables us to form correct beliefs about reality. Otherwise we would never be
able to apply the concept of  truth in real situations, i.e., we would never be able
to say (with an acceptable degree of  certainty) whether some statement is true
or false. Therefore, we have to find some way of  linking our epistemic evidence
(in the form of  reasons and a reliability measure) to a state of  affairs as it is in
the objective world. A realist epistemology enables us to do so. In a realist epis-
temology we may hold the assumption that we form true beliefs whenever they
are sufficiently justified.
5.2.2 Justification proper
Before I turn to a discussion of  the ‘justification proper’ criterion, I would like
to emphasise that justification can be either a state or a process. If, for instance,
a belief  p is acquired through a reliable process, p’s being justified is a state. If
we are in the process of  providing explicit reasons for p, thus justifying p, then
its justification is a process. To avoid confusion about the term justification, I
distinguish between two concepts: justification and justification proper. Justifi-
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cation refers to the state of  justification, i.e., it is a qualification for a belief  that
it is justified, while justification proper refers to the process of  justification, i.e.,
providing reasons. Where the type of  justification meant in this report is clear
from the context in which the term is used, the addition ‘proper’ will not always
be given.
Beliefs are justified in different ways, depending on their content and on their
type. A belief  can be justified by other beliefs, such as beliefs based on sensory
evidence, or beliefs based on the statement of  a different person. The belief
that the streets are dry could form a reason for me to believe that is has not
rained. A belief  can be justified for one person while it is not for another. For
instance, if  I lack reasons for a belief, but a friend of  mine has good reasons for
a belief with the same content, she will be justified in her belief, while I will not
be justified in my belief. When the justification of  a belief  is linked to a person
having that belief, this justification is called personal. If  the justification of  a
belief  is not linked to a person, it is called impersonal (Audi 1993, p. 216-217).
The following discussion of  justification is based on Pollock (cf. Pollock 1974,
1986). Justification consists in giving reasons for a belief. A reason is a ground
for a belief, which can be either conclusive or non-conclusive. A conclusive
reason entails its conclusion (the belief). A non-conclusive reason does not
entail its conclusion. Conclusive reasons constitute the logical entailment of
their conclusion. Non-conclusive reasons are inductive reasons and other (non-
logical) grounds (ibid., p. 36-39). Pollock (1986, p. 37) claims that most reasons
that matter (and are important for justification, and thus for epistemology) are
non-conclusive reasons. These reasons, called prima facie reasons, can be defeated,
which means that new information may lead us to reject such a prima facie reason
for a belief  (and thus, maybe, also reject the belief  the reason applies to). A
defeater in general is defined as follows (ibid., p. 38):
If P is a reason for S to believe Q, R is a defeater for this reason if and only if R is logically
consistent with P and (P&R) is not a reason for S to believe Q.
The reason P thus only yields a justified belief Q if there is no defeater R, that
in a conjunction with P would cancel the reason to believe Q. We cannot always
maintain that the absence of  a defeater yields justified belief. There may be a
reason for which there is no defeater made explicit yet. A procedural element
could be added to provide the opportunity to put forward such defeaters, but
even a procedure may not guarantee this.
There are two types of  defeaters: rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters.
A rebutting defeater is defined as follows (ibid., p. 38):
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If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is a rebutting defeater for this reason if and only
if R is a defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and R is a reason for S to believe ~Q.
In this case, R is just another reason. It has basically the same status as P, but its
conclusion is opposite to the conclusion of  P. An undercutting defeater is de-
fined as follows (ibid., p. 39):
If P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is an undercutting defeater for this reason if
and only if R is a defeater (for P as a reason for S to believe Q) and R is a reason for S to deny
that P would not be true unless Q were true.
An undercutting defeater differs from a rebutting defeater. It attacks the con-
nection between the reason and the belief  held as a consequence of  the pres-
ence of  that reason (ibid., p. 38-39). This amounts to the following. A defeater
may attack the conclusion of  a reason. However, it is possible that the conclu-
sion is not challenged, but that the reason is attacked. For instance, I assume
that there is a reason for me to believe that I will be happy next week. This
reason is that I read a prediction in a horoscope. An opponent may attack the
reason (I will be happy because the horoscope says so) instead of  the conclusion
(I will be happy).
I give the following definition of  justification proper, making use of  the concept
of  defeaters.
Personal justification proper
For a belief p to be justified there should be a conclusive reason r that entails p, or there should
be at least one good non-conclusive reason for the subject to believe that p, and here is no
defeater for that reason, nor for p, and the reason for p, nor p itself, is challenged.
In this definition only one justification step is required. Therefore, it is still a
relatively weak form of  justification. Three demands are imposed: (1) there is a
conclusive or a non-conclusive reason for p, (2) there are no defeaters for that
reason or for p, and (3) the reason and p are not challenged. With respect to the
first demand, we may impose a demand on the length of  the justification chain.
For example, there should be at least a reason for the reason that p, or a reason
for the reason for the reason that p. However, any decision on the length of  the
justification chain is arbitrary. A better solution would be to focus on the type of
belief  under consideration, and to base the length of  the chain on the demands
of  the type of  belief. For a belief  that there is a fierce tiger in front of me, for
example, the reason that I see the tiger in front of me suffices. With respect to
the second demand, there should not be any defeater present for the belief  or
for the reason. So, in relation to the example above, for instance, there should
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be no big-screen television in front of me with a picture of  a fierce tiger on it.
The third demand states that the belief  or the reason for that belief  should not
be challenged, i.e., there should be no reasonable demand for (further) evidence
(cf. Lodder 1998, p. 80).
The definition of  personal justification proper lacks a clear sense of  context-
sensitivity – the problem is that different kinds of  knowledge require different
kinds and degrees of  justification. What is more, part of  the justification of
specific types of  knowledge depends on their application. It is hard to collect
such criteria under a general description of  justification. The definitions above
only provide an onset to such a description.
The definition of  justification given above applies to personal beliefs. However,
it may also be applied to impersonal beliefs, i.e., beliefs not held by a specific
person.
Impersonal justification proper
For a belief p to be justified there should be a conclusive reason r that entails p, or there should
be at least one good non-conclusive reason for p, and there is no defeater for that reason, nor
for p, and the reason for p, nor p itself, is challenged.
The definition hardly differs from the one for personal justification. But the
character of  a reason for a belief  differs from the character of  a reason for
someone to believe p. A reason for me to believe p need not be a reason to
believe p for anyone.
5.2.3 Reliability
The criterion of  reliability mainly applies to perceptual beliefs. The issue that
induced the introduction of  the reliability criterion is illustrated by the following
example, drawn from Goldman (1976, p. 772-773), and paraphrased in Audi
(1993, p. 188). A person named Henry enters a district where, along the roads,
barns made out of  papier-mâché appear. At the border of  the district, he sees a
barn, which is a real one. Now, Henry’s belief  that he sees a barn is true and it is
justified, but is it knowledge? Goldman says we are inclined to say it is not. The
criterion that should be complied with is the reliability of  a belief, which is de-
fined by Goldman as the demand that there should be no event that could cause
the same belief, while that belief, which is justified and true, is not a piece of
knowledge. Thus, in case of Henry, there should be no papier-mâché barn on
the route. If  there is one, Henry could form a belief  about a real barn on the
same route (‘there is a barn right here’). He could be justified in believing it, and
the belief  would be true. But the belief  would not be knowledge, because of  the
possible occurrence of  an event that would prevent the belief  from being trans-
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formed into knowledge. This criterion of  reliability primarily concerns percep-
tual beliefs.
Audi lists a number of  subcriteria that determine whether a perceptual belief
complies with the reliability criterion (Audi 1993, p. 17):
1 the acuteness of the senses relevant to forming, sustaining, and confirming the belief;
2 the normality of their operation at the time;
3 the appropriateness of the perceptual circumstances to the content of the belief;
4 the normality of the perceiver’s responses to the sense(s);
5 the absence of a justified belief - or of justification for believing - that one or more of (1)-(4)
fails to hold.
In brief, these criteria amount to the following. Criterion (1) says that we should
have the power to discriminate a certain fact. So if  I claim that I see a barn, I
should be in close distance to it. In that case I can discriminate it clearly from its
surroundings, and do not mistake it with some other object (a barn facsimile).
Criterion (2) says that our senses should operate properly. Hallucinations and
optical illusions can disturb what we perceive. Criterion (3) says that our percep-
tion should be appropriate to the kind of  belief  it is supposed to sustain. This
means that when we perceive a colour, the lighting should enable us to distin-
guish red from green. Criterion (4) says that a disturbance between the act of
perceiving and the forming of  a belief  should not occur. While we see a red
thing, we may not belief  it is red, just because we are confused in some way.
Criterion (5) says that there should be no reason for us to believe that any of
these problems occurs at the time (ibid., p. 201-202).
If  we want to define the reliability criterion relative to testimonial beliefs, we will
have to find out whether the circumstances under which those beliefs are ac-
quired reliably are different from those for perceptual beliefs. The reliable acqui-
sition of  perceptual beliefs depends mainly on the reliability of  the cognitive
apparatus that produces those beliefs. Apart from this, the circumstances under
which the belief  is formed, such as the lighting, determines whether the reliabil-
ity of  the cognitive system is sufficient; a reliable cognitive system should also
be able to discriminate whether there the lighting is adequate, and if  not, refuse
to form a belief. In case a person forms an testimonial beliefs, the reliability of
this person’s cognitive system is relevant. But the reliability of  the belief  source
is also important. While our environment cannot be deemed reliable or unreli-
able (that would be a category mistake), the sources of  testimonial beliefs can.
Thus, if  I read a newspaper that generally has pretty accurate scoops on the
extramarital life of  the president, this adds to the reliable acquirement of  my
beliefs about the extramarital life of  the president via that newspaper.
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With the help of  an example, I explain a problem in applying the reliability
criterion. This problem arises from the distinction between perceptual beliefs
and testimonial beliefs. The distinction between perceptual beliefs and testimo-
nial beliefs is sometimes hard to maintain in case instruments are used. I assume
that a person called Peter holds a certain belief, namely ‘John left his house in
Amsterdam at 11.20 p.m. last Saturday’. We reconstruct the way in which he has
acquired his belief. If  he was present at the moment near John’s house, he could
have acquired the belief  ‘directly’, i.e., by his own senses. But what if  he was
observing John’s house via a closed video circuit from the Westertoren, one mile
distant from the actual spot? Belief  comes in only after Peter has seen John
leaving his house on the monitor. But the extra step involved in using a closed
video circuit causes more potential defeaters for the correctness of  Peter’s belief
to accrue.
Let us try to see this situation the other way around. What if  he had seen John
leaving his house directly from his point of  view way up high in the Westerto-
ren. Could this have yielded a more reliable belief  for Peter? Without binoculars,
it probably would not; he could easily have mistaken John for someone else. So,
an instrument can also improve the reliability of  a belief.
Insofar as the instruments we use are more or less parallel with our senses, such
as in the case of  using a pair of  glasses, binoculars, or a closed video circuit,
possible defeaters are found in the same subcriteria of  reliability as those de-
fined for perceptual beliefs. This means, for the subcriterion of  acuteness, that
the instruments used should be reliable. For the subcriterion of  normality of
operation, it means that the instruments should operate in a normal manner. For
the subcriterion of  appropriateness, it implies that the instruments should be
used under proper circumstances. For the subcriterion of  normality of  the per-
ceiver’s responses, it means that the instrument should function properly. If  it
has some built-in mechanism for interpretation, this mechanism should function
properly (such as a sensor for warmth, which should properly respond to
warmth). Finally, regarding the subcriterion of  the absence of  justified belief, it
means that for us, there is no justified belief  that those other four subcriteria do
not hold.
The subcriteria of  reliability for direct perceptual beliefs, (1) through (5), thus
can be applied to the instruments we use to extend our senses. But they can also
be applied to the reliability of  beliefs produced by autonomous (non-human)
systems. For instance, the reliability of  a computer that registers the temperature
each minute through the day can be tested according to the criteria above. Thus,
reliability applies to testimonial beliefs as well. This observation is important
with respect to legal information systems, as these contain representations of
testimonial beliefs.
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Concluding, a belief  is acquired reliably if  the process that leads to the forming
of  that belief  is reliable itself, i.e., if  that process generally yields correct beliefs.
5.2.4 Consistency
Consistency is a logical characteristic. We can employ it as a knowledge criterion
by requiring that, within a system of  beliefs, two beliefs do not contradict each
other. If, at some moment, I have the beliefs that ‘It is the case that John is a
thief ’ and ‘It is not the case that John is a thief ’, these beliefs are inconsistent
with each other. Statements can be made dependent on place, time, and other
contextual factors, so that two statements that would have been inconsistent if
uttered in the same context, become consistent if  uttered in different contexts.
Consistency is not only a logical characteristic, it also bears on reality. It is gener-
ally supposed that reality itself  never shows any inconsistencies, at least the part
of  reality we deal with in our daily life (not in particle physics). The relevance of
consistency as a knowledge criterion is as follows. Insofar as beliefs are about
reality, they should be consistent, as reality itself  is (supposedly) consistent. If
our beliefs are inconsistent, they cannot be knowledge. However, if we extend
our concept of  reality to things that are constructed by humans, such as institu-
tions and regulations, the premise of  inconsistency only applies to a limited
degree (cf. subsection 6.2.4).
5.2.5 Coherence
Coherence broadens the demands imposed on a set of  statements or beliefs as
compared to consistency. There are different definitions of  coherence, varying
from the logical definition of  Kirkham (1992) to the extensive definition of
BonJour (1985). Kirkham’s definition says that a coherent belief  set should be
consistent, and that there should be inductive or deductive implication relations
among the beliefs (cf. Kirkham 1992, p. 104):
· Each member of  some set of  statements or beliefs is consistent with any
subset of  the other statements or beliefs.
· Each statement or belief  is inductively or deductively implied by the set of
premises formed by all other statements or beliefs, or by each other state-
ment or belief.
BonJour (1985, paraphrased in Peczenik 1996, p. 316, from Bender 1989, p. 5)
lists the following criteria. For a set of  beliefs to be coherent,
· it should be logically consistent;
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· it has a high degree of  probabilistic consistency;
· it has a significant number of  relatively strong inferential connections among
component beliefs;
· it is relatively unified, i.e., does not divide into relatively unconnected sub-
systems;
· it contains few unexplained anomalies;
· it provides a relatively stable conception of  the world and remains coherent
(i.e., it satisfies the five criteria above in the long run), and
· it satisfies the Observation Requirement, i.e., it must contain laws attributing
a high degree of  reliability to a reasonable variety of  cognitively spontaneous
beliefs, including introspective beliefs.
In a comparison between Kirkham’s and BonJour’s coherence criteria, the strik-
ing difference is that Kirkham’s criterion refers only to logical characteristics of
the belief  set, while BonJour’s criterion also refers to the content of  those be-
liefs, the degree to which the beliefs in the set are unified, the stability of  the
belief  set, and the link between beliefs and the world (the Observation Re-
quirement). However, coherence is still an internalist criterion, i.e., it concerns
the internal relations of  some system. It does not concern the relations between
the system and reality, unless there are beliefs in the system that concern reality
(and that is what the Observation Requirement is about).
The degree of  coherence is often regarded as a direct measure for the degree of
truth of  the beliefs to which it applies. I reject this interpretation, because be-
liefs can be coherent without being about reality. But even if  coherence is not
used as a truth criterion itself, it can be used as a knowledge criterion in either of
two ways. First, its purpose can be to give epistemic support for the truth of  the
beliefs involved (instead of  being a direct measure for the truth of  the beliefs, it
gives support for the assumption that the beliefs involved are true by corre-
spondence). This is attained by employing the assumption that beliefs cohere
because they adequately represent a coherent reality. Second, its purpose can be to
support the beliefs by the mere fact that they cohere. In this case, coherence
directly supports the transition of  belief  to knowledge; it is an ideal in itself.
5.3 Combining knowledge criteria
The interaction among knowledge criteria becomes clearer when we introduce a
hierarchical organisation for them. In the example of  a definitional concept of
knowledge given in this subsection (in which all five criteria are used), truth and
justification are placed next to each other. Truth is the semantic criterion, justifi-
cation comprises of  three epistemic subcriteria, viz. justification proper (i.e.,
Truth Justification
Justification
proper
Reliability Coherence
Consistency
Knowledge
+
Belief
=
Knowledge
qualifi ation
Figure 5.2. Hierarchy among knowledge criteria
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providing reasons), reliability, and coherence. Consistency is a subcriterion of
coherence. Justification proper and coherence are related, in that providing of
reasons for some belief  also establishes some kind of  logical support between
the reason and the belief, which may increase coherence among beliefs. The
hierarchy is depicted in figure 5.2.
Combining such different knowledge criteria is possible. It leads to a concept of
knowledge which contains both internalist and externalist criteria. The internal-
ist criteria evaluate the content of  a belief  relative to an individual (i.e., in terms
of  that person’s internal states), while the externalist criteria evaluate the content
of  a belief  independent of  the internal states of  an individual. Truth, consid-
ered as correspondence, is not suitable as an evaluation criterion, but can be
used as a definitional criterion. In figure 5.3, I give a typology of  knowledge
criteria, indicating whether some knowledge criterion is internalist or externalist,
and epistemic or non-epistemic.
5.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, the following items have been discussed:
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Epistemology Epistemology concerns the acquisition, justification
and growth of  knowledge.
Belief  sources There are five belief  sources: perception, memory,
consciousness, reason, and testimony.
The doxastic
assumption
The doxastic assumption says that justification is given
completely in terms of  beliefs. It is rejected because it
allows only for criteria that concern the content of
beliefs.
non-epistemic
epistemic
truth
reliability
coherence
consistency
justification proper
externalist
internalist
Figure 5.3. Hierarchy among knowledge criteria
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The internalist
assumption
The internalist assumption says that justification is
given completely in terms of  internal states. It is re-
jected because it does not allow for relevant externalist
criteria.
Knowledge criteria A concept of  knowledge can be constructed from the
five criteria discussed (truth, justification proper, reli-
ability, coherence, and consistency).
Table 5.1. Concluding remarks
6. Knowledge in the legal domain
versus regular knowledge
In chapter 4, I explained that there is a distinction between legally relevant
knowledge and legal knowledge. The former category of  knowledge may be
amenable to different knowledge criteria than the latter one. Also, the way these
knowledge criteria are defined may differ for the two categories of  knowledge.
To find out whether this is the case, I investigate to what extent the criteria
employed for regular knowledge can be used for knowledge in the legal domain,
i.e., legally relevant knowledge and legal knowledge. To do this, I first try to
establish what belief  sources and belief  types we may distinguish in the legal
domain (section 6.1). Then I apply five knowledge criteria (discussed in the
previous chapter) to knowledge in the legal domain, and I discuss the relevance
of  the doxastic and externalist assumptions (section 6.2). Next, I try to indicate
under what circumstances legal and legally relevant beliefs may be qualified as
knowledge (section 6.3). Finally, I make some concluding remarks (section 6.4).
6.1 Belief sources and belief types in the legal domain
In this section, I discuss the sources of  legal beliefs (subsection 6.1.1) and the
types of  legal beliefs (subsection 6.1.2) we may distinguish in the legal domain.
For both subjects, a comparison with regular knowledge is made.
6.1.1 Belief sources
Traditional epistemology, in its examination of  knowledge acquisition, is heavily
biased towards perception as a knowledge source, while legal knowledge, and to
a lesser degree legally relevant knowledge, are often based on testimony. The
purpose of  the current subsection is to find out in greater detail what belief
sources are involved in legally relevant knowledge and legal knowledge. In sec-
tion 4.5, I listed different types of  knowledge. Table 6.1, at the end of  this sub-
section, is a copy of  the table in that section, except that in this table the belief
sources are filled in. In subsection 5.1.1, I listed five belief  sources: perception,
memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony.
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How do these belief  sources relate to the different belief  types in the legal do-
main? I first make two general remarks on this relation, and then I discuss the
three distinctions made in section 4.5. First, a source of  belief may be employed
by an agent in order to form a belief. This belief, on its turn, may be qualified as
knowledge if  it complies with certain specified criteria. So, a belief  source need
not be a knowledge source; a belief  source may for instance provide false in-
formation. As such, a source of  legal belief  need not be a source of  legal knowl-
edge.
Second, the entities called ‘knowledge sources for the law’ (cf. subsection 4.1.3)
are to be distinguished from belief  sources: the former item is about knowledge,
and the latter item is about belief. Moreover, knowledge sources for the law are
relevant sources for establishing legal norms. Belief  sources refer to the process
of  belief  acquisition that is employed. So, for instance, knowledge of  the Con-
stitution can be acquired from the Constitution (a knowledge source for the law,
to be more precise, a formal source of  law). The way this knowledge is acquired
may vary. We can read the Constitution (perception), we may remember its
content (memory), or someone might tell us about its content (testimony).
Three distinctions were made to classify knowledge: the distinction between
legally relevant knowledge and legal knowledge, between abstract knowledge
and concrete knowledge, and between factual knowledge and practical knowl-
edge. As to the first distinction, legally relevant knowledge, being ‘regular’
knowledge relevant for the legal domain, can be analysed within the paradigm of
traditional epistemology. As such, the five belief  sources should be adequate for
the analysis of  acquiring legally relevant knowledge. Legal knowledge may be
analysed within the same framework, but at the same time, we should consider
the special (normative) status of  such knowledge. A belief  source like testimony,
for instance, may be regulated. When a judge has to disregard some part of
evidence that she has already heard about, this is clearly a deviation from regular
knowledge acquirement through testimony.
As to the second distinction, abstract knowledge is not directly derived from
perception. Reason may be the belief  source in this case, but positing such a
source does say little, if  anything, about the mechanisms that are at work for
deriving abstract knowledge. The extensive work done on legal reasoning can
throw light on this subject matter (cf., e.g., Hage 1997, MacCormick 1978, Prak-
ken 1993). Memory, consciousness, and testimony can play the same role in
acquiring abstract knowledge as in acquiring concrete knowledge. In the acqui-
sition of  concrete knowledge all five belief  sources play a part.
As to the third distinction, belief  sources may be more easily used in the analysis
of  acquiring factual knowledge than in the analysis of  acquiring practical knowl-
edge. My beliefs about the content of  the Constitution can be traced back to
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perception, testimony, and memory, but my competence of  judging cases can
hardly be specified in terms of  belief  sources. The process of  acquiring such a
competence cannot be reduced to such a simple classification of  sources, espe-
cially because the way such a competence is acquired is hardly known.
Up till now, focus has been on belief  sources borrowed from traditional episte-
mology. Are there any other belief  sources that should be introduced to deal
with the different types of  knowledge discussed? No new belief  sources need to
be introduced, but some of  them have to be adjusted to the legal domain in
order to make sense. This applies to perception, testimony, and reason.
In the legal domain, the primary source of  knowledge consists of  texts, and
reading a text can be both considered as acquiring knowledge via perception,
and via testimony. In case just the content of  the text is important, perception is
the belief  source. In case the object the text refers to is concerned, testimony is
the belief  source. The two are closely related in the legal domain, where a law
text expresses the content of  legal norms. The content of  the law text is ac-
quired by perception, the content of  the legal norms by testimony, through the
law text. Reason covers the different types of  reasoning employed in the legal
domain, for instance a-contrario and analogical reasoning. These reasoning types
are generally accepted in the legal domain, even though they may yield logically
invalid conclusions.
These three belief  sources (perception, reason, and testimony) are regulated to a
certain extent by the law itself. When a judge has to disregard some part of
evidence that he has already seen or heard about, this is clearly a deviation from
regular knowledge acquirement through perception or testimony, where all reli-
able evidence should contribute to our knowledge. An example with respect to
reason as a belief  source is the use of  analogical reasoning. Such reasoning is
not permitted in Dutch Penal Law, while it is permitted in Dutch Civil Law.
In the schema below, for all categories of  knowledge the applicable belief
sources are listed. The difference between legally relevant knowledge and legal
knowledge is that acquiring the latter type of  knowledge is to a certain degree
regulated by the law itself. Reason plays a crucial role in acquiring most knowl-
edge, and covers the many different methods of  judicial interpretation (cf. sub-
section 4.2.2).
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Knowledge typology Legally relevant knowl-
edge
Legal knowledge
Factual
knowledge
about
· memory
· reason
· testimony
belief  sources restricted
by legal regulations
· memory
· reason (legal reasoning)
· testimony
Abstract
knowledge
Practical
knowledge
· reason · reason (legal reasoning)
Factual
knowledge
about
· perception
· memory
· reason
· testimony
belief  sources restricted
by legal regulations
· perception
· memory
· reason (legal reasoning)
· testimony
Concrete
knowledge
Practical
knowledge
· reason · reason (legal reasoning)
Table 6.1. Typology of  belief  sources
6.1.2 Belief types
The typology of  knowledge given in section 4.5 is also a suitable means of  giv-
ing a typology of  beliefs in the legal domain. This typology of  beliefs is based on
the object of  knowledge. It is constructed through almost the same divisions as
the typology of  knowledge: the divisions between legally relevant beliefs and
legal beliefs, and between abstract and concrete beliefs. The division between
factual and practical beliefs is not made, because practical knowledge is not
based on explicit beliefs.
Apart from these divisions, a typology of  beliefs can be made on the basis of
their source. The different belief  sources were described in subsection 5.1.1 for
regular knowledge and in subsection 6.1.1 for knowledge in the legal domain.
My claim is that legal knowledge nominally arises from the same sources as
legally relevant knowledge. However, the way in which these sources are em-
ployed may differ considerably, as noted in the previous subsection. The belief
types arising from these sources are perceptual beliefs (based on perception),
memorial beliefs (based on memory), reasoned beliefs (based on some kind of
reasoning), and testimonial beliefs (based on testimony). To these, I add the type
of  interpretative beliefs. The reason why these belief  types are distinguished, is
that their origination may also have an impact on the way they should be turned
into knowledge.
  Knowing the law
69
Perceptual beliefs are beliefs that persons acquire directly through their senses.
It would be naive to say that this category of  beliefs does not require any form
of  interpretation, as perception is not a passive process. Let us, instead, say that
to acquire a perceptual belief  does not require any conscious act of  reasoning,
and that the state of  affairs perceived is indeed the object of  the belief. An
example of  a perceptual beliefs is the belief  ‘John is crossing the street’, held by
Peter, who sees John crossing the street. Another example is the belief  ‘the
envelope is white’, held by Susan, who holds a white envelope in her hands.
Memorial beliefs are formed on the basis of  the memory of  a person. For in-
stance, a person who has once seen someone passing by on a yellow-painted
bicycle, may remember this later. Accordingly, she forms a memorial belief  that
she once saw a person passing by on a yellow-painted bicycle. Acquiring beliefs
from memory may cause distortions due to the specific functioning of  human
memory.
Reasoned beliefs arise from clearly defined reasoning schemes. Such beliefs,
which are ‘calculated’ by clearly defined mathematical procedures (algorithms),
for instance arise from deduction, induction, and argumentation procedures.
The demand is that there should be a fixed, verifiable procedure with verifiable
input. Together these will lead to a verifiable output.
Testimonial beliefs are derived from indirect evidence, i.e., evidence that signifies
that some state of  affairs holds, but that does not directly refer to that state of
affairs. To elaborate on the two examples given above: if  I acquire a belief  ‘John
crosses the street’ when Peter tells me so, and I believe him, I acquire a testimo-
nial belief. If  I see a written statement saying that Susan thinks the envelope she
holds is white, and I believe this statement, then I acquire a testimonial belief  as
well. These testimonial beliefs require an implicit or explicit inference step (e.g.,
she tells me p, so p).
Interpretative beliefs are not derived by a simple inference from other beliefs or
evidence. Instead, they depend on certain choices and valuations. The process
leading to an interpretation is not completely verifiable, and thus the output is
not verifiable either. Interpretative beliefs occur for instance when a judge sen-
tences in a ‘hard case’, a case in which there appears to be no clear way to apply
a valid rule of  law to a specific case.
By far the most interesting types of  legal belief  – taken by this classification –
are reasoned beliefs and interpretative beliefs. The former is the category of
those beliefs whose origination is clear, i.e., we know how they are derived from
other beliefs. The latter is the category of  those beliefs of which we do not
know exactly what factors played a role in their determination, or how these
factors were valuated.
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6.2 Knowledge criteria for legal beliefs
A belief  has to comply with certain criteria in order to qualify as knowledge
depend on its type. However, beliefs about situations have to comply with other
knowledge criteria to become knowledge than beliefs about regulations or be-
liefs about interpretations. Thus, knowledge criteria are context-dependent: the
set of  applicable criteria varies, as well as the exact nature of  the applicable
criteria. This view is similar to the so-called contextualist view in general episte-
mology (cf. DeRose 1999, p. 187ff.). Contextualism says that the truth of  a claim
about whether a person knows something depends on conditions that vary with
the situation in which that claim is made. My claim is that the set of  criteria that
should apply for a belief  to become knowledge depends on the type of  belief
concerned. The type of  a belief  is both determined by its source (e.g., testi-
mony), its object (e.g., a legal norm), and the nature of  that object (in this case,
an abstract factual belief). The belief  itself, together with the context in which it
is uttered, and the context in which it is evaluated, determines what criteria
apply, and exactly how these criteria are defined. Knowledge criteria for beliefs
in the legal domain are discussed in this section.
In the following subsections, the five knowledge criteria listed in section 5.2 are
discussed from the viewpoint of  knowledge in the legal domain. These are,
subsequently, truth (subsection 6.2.1), justification (subsection 6.2.2), reliability
(subsection 6.2.3), consistency (subsection 6.2.4), and coherence (subsection
6.2.5). Then I discuss the relevance of  the doxastic assumption (subsection
6.2.6) and the externalist assumption (subsection 6.2.7) for the assessment of
legal knowledge. After that, I provide a proposal for the application of  knowl-
edge criteria to the different types of  legal beliefs.
6.2.1 Truth
In subsection 5.2.1, I discussed epistemic and non-epistemic conceptions of
truth. In the legal domain there are more epistemic than non-epistemic notions
of  truth. For an extensive discussion of  different conceptions of  truth in this
domain, I refer to Patterson (1996). Truth as correspondence is not very often
considered a suitable criterion for application in the legal domain. For instance,
Aarnio (1981) thinks the question what is a just interpretation of  a certain norm
is a problem for correspondence. There are many interpretations possible for
any norm, and correspondence truth seems to allow only one: the one that
corresponds to the norm. Correspondence truth needs, in other words, the
doctrine of  the one correct solution (ibid., p. 37). Aarnio’s proposal is to replace
truth with acceptance. Acceptance is defined relative to some (legal) community:
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the whole group or some part of  it. However, acceptance is no replacement for
truth.
Niiniluoto (1981) criticises Aarnio’s rejection of  correspondence truth. He says
that Aarnio’s mistake is to place acceptance and values in the relation between
norm propositions and legal order. Acceptance is the degree to which a com-
munity (or auditory) adheres to some value. Niiniluoto states that acceptance
and values are part of  social reality (ibid., p. 74). It thus becomes possible to
determine the truth of  norm propositions (i.e., statements about norms). To put
it in a different way: acceptance and values are relative to an auditory, but the
moment they are established, they are prone to correspondence truth.
Even in parts of  the legal domain, truth is non-epistemic. And for the parts of
this domain where we need an epistemic truth notion, such as acceptability, we
should not try to apply truth at all. The legal domain is partly constructed by
human beings. This part of  reality is often objective, which means that truth
remains non-epistemic. The following example illustrates this.
Assume that one day humanity ceases to exist. Assume that there is still a book,
called ‘Truths about humanity’. It consists of  a list of  statements. One of  these
statements is: ‘In 1999, Dutch penal law said that killing a person on purpose
counts as manslaughter’. The sentence is true. It will still be true if  there is no
human being to state that it is true and to justify it. It will still be true if  some
aliens land on earth, find the book, learn the language, find evidence (in other
books), and regard the statement as true. And it will still be true if  these aliens
land on earth, find the wrong evidence, and think it is false.
I adapt the notion of  correspondence truth to accommodate mind-dependent
facts, i.e., facts that were constructed by human intervention:
A sentence is true or false in virtue of: (a) its structure; (b) the referential relations between its
parts and reality; (c) the objective nature of that reality.
In this definition, only part (c) is altered. In the original definition Devitt (1991)
refers to the ‘objective and mind-independent nature of  that reality’. The mind-
independence demand is left out because it restricts the application area of  the
correspondence truth criterion too much. To be able to apply the non-epistemic
correspondence truth criterion we just need to guarantee that the parts of  reality
we are talking about are not true (or false) because we say they are true (or
false), but because they have been established already when we state something
about them. For instance, the establishment of  such facts can be attained by
institutional rules or by conventions.
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Does the doctrine of  the one correct solution coincide with the correspondence
truth criterion, or: need there be one exclusive interpretation of  some norm to
be able to employ correspondence truth? Let us first determine what corre-
spondence truth exactly applies to. Correspondence truth only applies to sen-
tences (in either a formal or a natural language). Take some sentences s and t
that are interpretations of  a legal regulation l. The question is now whether s or t
is a true interpretation of  l, and if  so, if  s or t is the only true interpretation of  l.
The application of  the notion of  truth depends on the establishment of  inter-
pretations of  l. Interpretations are established, e.g., when a judge sentences in a
specific case. In a legal positivism stance, the legal system itself  indicates under
what circumstances a person is authorised to interpret the law and make ver-
dicts.
From such a viewpoint, determining truth in the legal domain involves the
comparison of  statements with facts, just like truth in other contexts. Legal
truth follows upon the establishment of  facts, and these facts are established by
certain qualified legal professionals. Thus, truth itself  is not ‘human-made’, but
the reality it refers to is. One of  the consequences of  this is that the truth of
two different interpretations is determined by the consistency of  reality. If  two
interpretations can exist in reality, they can both be true, if truth is an applicable
criterion. And this is precisely the problem. To apply the notion of  truth to
interpretative beliefs means that we establish new facts (interpretations), for
instance by making statements. By making these statements, we establish the
truth of  those facts at the same time. Establishing the truth of  an interpretative
belief  should thus be carefully distinguished from the truth of  beliefs about
those interpretative beliefs. Even though the possibility of  establishing the truth
of  interpretative belief may be denied, we can still make true statements about
those beliefs.
6.2.2 Justification proper
Justification proper is central to knowledge in the legal domain. The focus is
somewhat different from justification for regular knowledge. In traditional
epistemology, justification is discussed mainly with respect to perceptual beliefs.
Justification in the legal domain also applies to interpretative beliefs. The mo-
ment interpretation of  some law text is demanded, different sources of  justifi-
cation enter. Material and formal sources of  law may be adopted as such. Aarnio
(1987, p. 123-131) lists six sources of  justification: (1) the law text itsef, (2) the
process that led to the accomplishment of  the law text (‘traveaux préparatoires’),
(3) systemic interpretation in accordance with the legal system (coherence crite-
ria), (4) court decisions (case law), (5) doctrinal opinion (legal literature), and (6)
practical reasons (goal-directed reasoning) (Aarnio 1987, p. 123-131). Their
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justificatory nature is given by a legal tradition which also determines the preva-
lence of  one source over another. Material as well as formal sources of  law may
be recognised in this list.
I discuss three types of  justification: internal justification, justification by coher-
ence, and procedural justification. Next, I discuss the view Hage (1997) has
developed on justification. Then I explain the meaning of  justification proper in
accordance with these different views of  justification.
The first type, internal justification, is provided by the presence of  explicit rules
of  law and facts. With a case that fits the description of  the law, we can make a
subsumption, and thus provide so-called ‘internal justification’ for the judge-
ment that follows from the premises. Of  course, internal justification itself  does
not involve interpretation. The interpretation steps performed are found in the
premises of  the subsumption.
The second type is justification by coherence. The idea is: if  a set of  beliefs is
coherent, this constitutes the justification of  individual beliefs in that set. It
would be more suitable to say the following. The fact that the set S of  beliefs, of
which p is a member, is coherent, is one of  the reasons to believe that p is the
case. Thus, rather than assuming that coherence directly constitutes justification,
it should be regarded as a reason, thus constituting the justification proper of  p.
The third type of  justification is procedural justification. Procedural justification
is based on the idea that a satisfactory defence of  some stance can only be es-
tablished in a process of  exchanging arguments, while this process is subject to a
set of  rules. An example of  a procedural criterion is the no-challenge criterion
that was accommodated in the notion of  justification proper in subsection 5.2.2.
I refer to Gordon (1995) and Lodder (1998) for such procedural approaches to
justification, in which different moves of  an argumentation game are modelled
in detail. Models such as these involve at least two parties exchanging arguments.
The rules in the model determine what moves are allowed, and how the ex-
change of  arguments is ended (if  this demand is part of  the rule set).
In an argumentation process between two persons, sometimes a third one de-
cides whether the rules of  the argumentation process are properly followed.
This third person can also stop the argumentation chain. Not surprisingly, in the
legal domain the judge plays this role. Her decisions regarding procedure and
content intervene with the argumentation process that is going on between the
plaintiff  or the public prosecutor and the defendant. Her role thus consists of
two main parts: making the participants follow the procedural rules established
in the law, and making a decision after the procedure has come to an end. She
then has to apply the criteria established in law herself  to reach a decision re-
garding the content of  the case. To make sure that she follows the right proce-
dure, an appeal to her decision is often possible.
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Hage (1997) elaborated on the concept of  reasoning in the legal domain. He
states that there are two stages in legal reasoning. In the first stage, there is a set
of  principles. Principles have a more general nature than rules; they are less
concrete. Principles are checked for their validity. If  the conditions of  a princi-
ple are satisfied, and the principle is not excluded, it generates reasons for or
against the conclusion of  an argument. These reasons for and against an argu-
ment are, on their turn, weighed against each other, and then lead to the conclu-
sion of  an argument. Approximately the same two-step process applies to
reasoning with rules. The reasons resulting from the two two-step processes can
be used in order to support the conclusion of  a legal rule.
Hage’s account of  the nature of  legal rules takes into account the aspect of
defeasibility. In the case of  legal rules, this means that a rule whose application
conditions are satisfied, may still not be applicable. There are scope limitations
for a legal rule, for instance that it applies only to facts that have taken place on
Dutch territory. There are also exceptions which are formulated in the legal rule
itself. And there are proper exceptions to legal rules, for instance the justifica-
tion grounds in criminal law. Instead of  the traditional model of  legal reasoning,
in which a rule applies whenever all conditions of  the rule are satisfied, Hage
focusses on the justification of  the conclusion of  the rule. Legal reasoning is
about giving reasons for a conclusion, and legal rules may (as a consequence of
defeasibility at several levels) fail to generate their conclusion under certain cir-
cumstances.
The definition of  justification proper I employ for the legal domain is the same
as I gave in subsection 5.2.2. It is based on the idea that there should be either a
conclusive or non-conclusive reason for a subject to believe a certain proposi-
tion p. Additionally, there should not be a defeater for this proposition, nor for
the reason for the subject to believe that proposition. Finally, the proposition
should not be challenged, and the reason should not be challenged. This defini-
tion appeals to either internal justification (cf. the presence of  a conclusive rea-
son), or procedural justification (the presence of  a defeater). However, simply
abolishing the problem of  giving a justification chain of  sufficient length by
limiting the justification to one reason cannot be called an ideal solution. The
coherence criterion is left out on purpose; it is discussed below as a separate
criterion. I assume that coherence constitutes justification in general, together
with justification proper, reliability and coherence.
The definition of  justification proper above is compatible with Hage’s view on
legal reasoning, in which defeasibility plays an important role as well. Note,
however, that the justification proper of  a belief  in order to qualify it as knowl-
edge, is something different from an account of  good legal reasoning. In the
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former case, the justification proper concerns the correctness of  the belief
relative to its object. In the latter case, good legal reasoning arises from taking
into account certain demands during the process of  reasoning. The two may
coincide. Assume that the justification of  a legal conclusion is given entirely in
terms of  the process that led to that belief  (the process was followed correctly,
arguments were exchanged, reasons were weighed). If  we assume that such a
legal conclusion is a legal belief  that should be qualified as legal knowledge, we
adopt a view in which that qualification is attained through procedural justifica-
tion. However, the account of  justification proper given here primarily applies
to beliefs about legal conclusions. For the justification of  such beliefs, we may
appeal to more reasons than just to those following from procedure.
6.2.3 Reliability
An adapted form of  reliability for the legal domain should allow for the assess-
ment of  beliefs concerning legal affairs. But reliability has traditionally been
applied to perceptual beliefs. These beliefs constitute only a small part of  the
beliefs relevant for the legal domain. Reliability is a measure for the integrity of
the cognitive system. It is an externalist criterion, i.e., it provides us with the
chance that our cognitive system yields correct beliefs, and this measure is de-
termined independently of  our internal states.
There are controlled situations in which the average reliability of  a cognitive
system can be checked, for example with real and fake line-ups in confronta-
tions of  witnesses with criminals. Also, we can determine what inferences peo-
ple make without having sufficient reasons for them. Assume, for example, that
John saw a robber leaving a bank. He saw the robber wear a red hat. John also
knows a person, Vern, who has obscure antecedents and who always wears a red
hat. He concludes that Vern robbed the bank. This, of  course, is not a valid
(deductive) inference. It may be an acceptable inference in the legal domain, but
then we have to make sure that Vern is one of  very few people who wear a red
hat. The tendency to make inferences like the one above is a factor that de-
creases the reliability of  cognitive systems. Apart from that, if  John said that the
robber wore a red hat, while he actually wore a green one, this of  course is also
a measure for the reliability of  his cognitive system. The good thing about these
kinds of mistakes is that we can test for them in controlled situations, from
which we derive a certain measure for reliability in uncontrolled situations, such
as in legal practice.
In subsection 5.2.3, I listed Audi’s (1993, p. 17) five criteria for determining the
reliability of  a belief. These are the acuteness of  the senses relevant to forming,
sustaining, and confirming the belief; the normality of  their operation at the
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time; the appropriateness of  the perceptual circumstances to the content of  the
belief; the normality of  the perceiver’s responses to the sense(s); and the ab-
sence of  a justified belief  - or of  justification for believing - that one or more of
the criteria mentioned above fail to hold. These criteria all hold for perceptual
and testimonial beliefs in the legal domain as well.
For the other types of  belief, the reliability criterion has to be rephrased. Reli-
ability applies to the way a belief  has been formed. In the case of  a memorial
belief  that is originally based upon perception, both the reliability of  the per-
ceptual apparatus and the reliability of  the memory of  a person are relevant. In
case of  a reasoned belief, there should be an acceptable reasoning method. And
in case of  interpretative beliefs, the way the belief  is acquired should be accept-
able as well. I define reliability in the legal domain as follows:
A legal belief is acquired in a reliable manner whenever the route by which it is acquired is
acceptable by the standards in a given legal and social context.
Reliability is thus based upon the acceptability of  the route by which a belief  is
acquired. In case of  perceptual beliefs, reliability is measured in terms of  the
production of  truth. In case of  reasoned beliefs, the truth criterion may have to
be dropped. Instead, the adherence to procedure becomes important for the
fulfilment of  the reliability criterion. If  there is no fixed procedure for the ac-
quisition of  a belief, such as with interpretative beliefs, the acceptability of  its
acquisition can be determined entirely by relating to the content of  the inter-
pretative belief. To establish the acceptability of  the acquisition route of  inter-
pretative beliefs, we refer to the reasons given for it. Reliability is then reduced
to the fulfilment of  the justification proper criterion for a sufficient amount of
interpretative beliefs produced by a certain person.
The difference between the reliability criterion and the justification proper crite-
rion is that the former is located in the ‘context of  discovery’, and the latter in
the ‘context of  justification’. The former is about the production of  beliefs, and
the adherence to the procedures that perform this task, the latter is about pro-
viding good reasons for the the result of  the procedure. Distinguishing the two
is difficult, because the adherence to a procedure also adds to the justification
proper of  a belief.
6.2.4 Consistency
Consistency is mainly a logical criterion. It says that a sentence and its negation
cannot at the same time be true or false. But the criterion has some bearing on
reality, too, if we adhere to a correspondence notion of  truth. If  reality is con-
sistent, a state-of-affairs cannot at the same time hold and not hold. In that case,
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true statements about that state-of-affairs can never be inconsistent either. It is
probably reasonable to assume that physical reality is consistent. But does the
same hold for ‘higher-level’ existence of, for example, legal norms? The consis-
tency demand then quickly collapses into an almost empty criterion. Goodman
(1978) wrote that two statements about an apple, one saying that it is red, and
another saying that it is yellow, can both be true. This does not yield any incon-
sistencies if  the apple is yellow on the one side, and red on the other. Adding
more detail to the statements could still yield inconsistencies, but Goodman’s
point is clear. If  even common-sense physical objects like apples yield inconsis-
tent statements, the law will definitely provide us with severe inconsistencies.
And indeed, it does. Legal texts often contain mistakes, and some texts contra-
dict with other ones. But this does not necessarily lead to major problems.
The employment of  consistency as a knowledge criterion is dangerous, as it is
very easily violated, especially in a legal setting. The only sensible way of  using it
is when the criterion is defined carefully regarding contextual parameters such as
place and time. It would then have the following form:
If an individual or an object, or a relation among individuals or objects has a certain characteris-
tic, the same characteristic or relation cannot at the same time not hold for those individuals or
objects.
Applied to beliefs, this means that the content of  one belief may not contradict
with the content of  a different belief, if  they both refer to a characteristic of
one object or individual.
6.2.5 Coherence
Coherence in law is defined in very different ways, but with very much the same
intentions. MacCormick (1978, p. 152) states about coherence that ‘the multitu-
dinous rules of  a developed legal system should ‘make sense’ when taken to-
gether’. The criterion usually consists of  a demand of  consistency plus a
demand of  the presence of  reasonable content-relations among beliefs. Thus,
two beliefs cohere with each other when they do not logically exclude each other
and we are able to say that they fit in with each other. Take the following three
examples:
p: It is the case that people below the age of  30 committing theft are sentenced
to three years of  imprisonment, and
q: It is not the case that people below the age of  30 committing theft are sen-
tenced to three years of  imprisonment
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p: People below the age of  30 committing theft are sentenced to three years of
imprisonment, and
q: People above the age of  30 committing theft are not sentenced to imprison-
ment
p: People committing theft for the first time are sentenced to two years of  im-
prisonment, and
q: People committing theft for the second time are sentenced to three years of
imprisonment
In the first case, p and q are simply inconsistent, thus p and q do not cohere. In
the second case, p and q are consistent, but they do not cohere, as there seems
to be no reason whatsoever to make this distinction between people under and
above the age of  30. In the third case, p and q can be said to cohere, as they are
consistent and there is a reason to punish a recidivist more severely than a per-
son who is sentenced for the first time.
Peczenik (1989, p. 178-179) distinguishes between thirteen subcriteria consti-
tuting the notion of  coherence. I summarise these subcriteria by three measures.
The first measure, support, relates to the degree to which some statement is
backed by reasons, and the degree to which it is interconnected with other (uni-
versal) statements, and the degree to which a set of  statements contains sup-
ported statements, etc.. The second measure, preference, indicates the degree to
which principles relate to each other in a preferential order. The third measure,
universality, denotes the degree to which concepts can be applied generally, re-
semble each other, are cross-connected, etc.. According to Peczenik, the list
applies to statements, universal statements, concepts, theories, reasons, chains of
reasons, and principles. But for the sake of  simplicity, I assume that they apply
to beliefs as well.
The criteria are used to sustain coherence as an ideal of  mutual dependency of
beliefs. The main assumption that should justify the choice of  coherence as a
knowledge criterion is as follows: a highly coherent theory of  some part of
reality reflects that part of  reality, and as a corollary from that assumption,
statements of  a coherent theory are true statements (cf. Peczenik 1989, p. 184-
186). There are two ways of  attacking such a claim. First, starting from a coher-
ent theory, it is not necessarily about the world that it should be about; the
world may be completely different from the coherent picture we give about it.
Second, starting from the world, how do we acquire a coherent theory about it?
Surely not by just constructing a theory that is as coherent as possible. Instead,
we should conform to empirical data about the world, and those data may be
less coherent than we would wish.
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But there is also an argument in support of  employing coherence as a knowl-
edge criterion. The legal domain is a part of  reality constructed by human be-
ings. If we try to theorise about that part of  reality, it could be argued that
coherence is a reasonable criterion to employ. Human beings usually try to apply
as much consistency on the things they design as possible. The quality of  some
work (be it a law or a book) is often judged by coherence-type criteria. There-
fore, coherence becomes a more reasonable demand.
Peczenik (ibid., p. 188) lists three limitations of  the coherence criterion. First,
coherence consists of  multiple criteria, and the balancing of  those criteria does
not always lead to a clear answer if  the coherence of  a given system exceeds the
coherence of  a different system. Second, the coherence criterion cannot prevent
that unjust beliefs remain present in a system of  beliefs; coherence does not
regard moral content. Still, Peczenik claims that a higher degree of  coherence
contributes to justice (ibid.). Third, all normative systems suffer from incom-
pleteness; new norms and concepts are introduced or old norms and concepts
are adjusted so as to fit in with new cases. Thus, even if  there is a measure of
coherence, its value varies over time.
A different set of  three subcriteria of  coherence is given by Alexy (1998, p. 41).
He regards the following elements as constitutive parts of  coherence: consis-
tency, comprehensiveness, and connection. The subcriterion of  consistency says
that a coherent set of  propositions should not include a contradiction. The
subcriterion of  comprehensiveness says that a coherent set of  propositions
should contain ‘as many and as different propositions as possible’ (ibid., p. 42).
Alexy claims that, ideally, a coherent theory covers as much parts of  the world
as possible. This means that it should contain propositions about all these dif-
ferent parts. The subcriterion of  connection means that there should be as
many relations as possible among propositions, where one proposition is a rea-
son for another. If  we compare these claims to the three subcriteria of  Pec-
zenik’s, it seems that comprehensiveness is similar to the universality
subcriterion, and connection is similar to the support criterion.
Another approach to coherence is Brouwer’s (1990). He lists four elements that
constitute coherence (ibid., p. 25-29). First, the part-whole relation between
sources of  law and legal norms features a degree of  coherence, which is in-
creased when that relation is less ambiguous. When two sources of  law together
constitute a certain norm, but they also give rise to a norm different from the
first, this may decrease coherence. Second, the presence of  logical relations (for
instance, deducibility) or absence of  logical relations (for instance, inconsis-
tency) increases coherence. Third, if  there are elements in a set that presuppose
the presence of  other ones, and those other elements exist, then coherence is
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increased. Brouwer (ibid., p. 27) gives the following example (translated from
Dutch): ‘If  a person does A without permission from B, then he will be pun-
ished with C’. This norm presupposes that B has the competence to issue a
permission. If  he does not, this will decrease overall coherence. Fourth, the
mutual relations between legal norms and legal principles are a factor in deter-
mining coherence. Brouwer says that the presence of  legal principles alone does
not provide coherence. Legal principles can provide arguments pro or contra
some norm. They may increase coherence, if  different legal principles can help
us defend the same norm, but they also may decrease coherence, in case differ-
ent legal principles provide reasons pro and contra a norm at the same time.
All four criteria can be characterised as support-criteria, i.e., they concern the
relations among statements which sometimes belong to different categories. The
other categories that I used to classify Peczenik’s coherence criteria do not apply
to Brouwer’s criteria.
Coherence, summarising, concerns the presence and nature of  relations among
a set of  beliefs (or statements): its main ingredient is the support measure men-
tioned above. Except for the demand of  consistency of  the beliefs considered,
content relation among those beliefs play a central role in the concept of  coher-
ence. There is a relation between the criterion of  justification proper and the
coherence criterion. Justification concerns the contents of  individual beliefs and
reasons for those beliefs. Coherence is evaluated with respect to larger sets of
beliefs, and it concerns the logical nature of  the relations among them. Justifica-
tion proper is evaluated with respect to an individual belief, or a belief-chain,
and it regards the content of  reasons and beliefs.
6.2.6 The doxastic assumption
Are all beliefs in the legal domain ultimately justified by other beliefs? If  this is
the case, the doxastic assumption is correct for the legal domain. If  not, the
doxastic assumption is false. However, the answer to the question when a belief
is ultimately justified is partly a matter of  choice. In the legal domain this is
especially important, as legislators and judges often determine justification crite-
ria on their own. They are able to decide that some set of  reasons is sufficient
for justifying a belief.
Can the doxastic assumption still apply if we externalise beliefs, i.e., when state-
ments or propositions, instead of  beliefs, become the object of  knowledge
criteria? In one sense there is a very clear answer to this question: no. If we take
the doxastic assumption literally, and thus assume that justification must occur
completely in terms of  personal beliefs, externalised beliefs can never be subject
to justification. In a different sense, we could assume that an impersonal belief
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is justified by other impersonal beliefs that could be personal beliefs as well.
Some reason for me to believe that there is a fierce tiger before me can be used as
a reason for an impersonal belief with the same content.
We should rephrase the doxastic assumption to employ it with impersonal be-
liefs. It would then amount to the following: the justification of  an impersonal
belief  (proposition or statement) is given ultimately in the form of  other imper-
sonal beliefs (propositions or statements). This impersonal approach suffers
from the same defect as the original doxastic assumption: the relation between
impersonal beliefs and the facts they are about. Nothing guarantees us that
impersonal beliefs are about facts, and that they are correct. In any attempt to
found that relation on a special class of  impersonal beliefs, or on the coherence
within the set of  impersonal beliefs, we thus encounter the same problems as
with the original doxastic assumption. Also, if  we employ the doxastic assump-
tion, we cannot apply externalist knowledge criteria, as these are precisely the
criteria not admitted in doxastic justification. Apart from these problems, there
seems to be no reason whatsoever to exclude any form of  justification (doxastic
or non-doxastic) once we are tackling impersonal beliefs. After all, we have al-
ready crossed the border between the ‘knowing subject’ and the ‘known object’
then. The doxastic assumption arises from the supposed impossibility of  cross-
ing this border for the purpose of  justifying some belief.
If  we reject the doxastic assumption, and we want to maintain the assumption
that there are such things as impersonal beliefs, are there still alternatives open
with respect to justification? In fact, three alternatives listed by Pollock (1986, p.
19-25) are still open, including direct realism (justification through direct access
to the world), probabilism (justification through probability of  individual be-
liefs) and reliabilism (justification through the reliability of  a cognitive system).
After all, all three positions can be applied to an artificial system, for instance a
robot (cf. the adoption of  direct realism in Pollock 1999).
If  impersonal beliefs are to be qualified as knowledge under certain conditions,
we have to show how impersonal beliefs can be justified. We usually trust our
senses when we acquire beliefs like ‘there is a fierce tiger in front of me’. There-
fore, it is reasonable to expect that there is a fierce tiger in front of me when my
travel-mate says so and there are no good reasons not to believe him. Imper-
sonal beliefs are justified in the same way. In this case, the remark of my travel-
mate is not meant as a means for me to believe that I should run, only as a justi-
fying reason for the impersonal belief  that there is a fierce tiger in front of  a
person (who happens to be me). As a consequence, reasons can be employed as
a means of  justification for impersonal as well as personal beliefs.
On the ground of  the reasons listed above, I reject the doxastic assumption.
Not all legal beliefs are ultimately justified by other beliefs. In the next subsec-
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tion, the externalist assumption is dealt with. By rejecting the doxastic assump-
tion, we now have a choice from direct realism (both internalist and non-
doxastic) and externalist theories.
6.2.7 The externalist assumption
Should beliefs be evaluated externally? The externalist assumption says so. It
claims that we have to appeal to externalist rather than internalist criteria when
we attempt to justify a belief. In subsection 5.1.3, I discussed the externalist
assumption. My present purpose is to give the assessment relative to the legal
domain. I remarked that it is not impossible on principle to combine internalist
and externalist epistemological criteria. What should a combination of  internal-
ist and externalist criteria look like in the legal domain? Assume that there is a
witness telling the judge that she has seen a red car driving by. This witness
happens to be a professor, and she has done some excellent research on the
reliability of witnesses. This makes the judge believe that the professor’s testi-
mony is reliable, and that it justifies her own conclusion that a red car indeed
drove by. The only problem is that the witness is colour-blind, and no one
knows this.
Here reliability comes in. Are we not able to check the reliability of  the profes-
sor’s colour-vision? And is it not the case that this is an appeal to an externalist
epistemological criterion? I would say it is. The adoption of  reliability amounts
to a form of  belief  externalism, as an externalist criterion is adopted. When the
reliability criterion is fulfilled, it is further assessed whether the statement com-
plies with internalist criteria.
Are there conflicts between the adoption of  internalist and externalist criteria at
the same time? There are no such conflicts prior to the mixed application of
knowledge criteria. However, conflicts may arise from their actual application.
We then have the problem in what order of  preference to apply different crite-
ria. For now it suffices to say that neither the internalist nor the externalist as-
sumption is rejected. A defence of  a certain piece of  knowledge in the legal
domain can be given on the basis of  both internalist and externalist criteria.
6.3 The qualification of belief and practice as knowledge
In the discussion of  regular knowledge, I claimed that beliefs should comply
with certain criteria to qualify as knowledge. In the current section, it is my
purpose to discuss this qualification for the different types of  legally relevant
and legal knowledge that were distinguished earlier in this report. To do so, I
first repeat the different knowledge types employed (subsection 6.3.1), then I
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discuss how the different knowledge criteria relate to each other (subsection
6.3.2, and next I state how these knowledge criteria actually apply to beliefs and
practices (subsection 6.3.3).
6.3.1 Knowledge types
Since the start of  this report, there has been a considerable increase of  the
number of  knowledge types, both arising from distinctions between types of
belief (where knowledge arising from such beliefs inherits the type of  the belief  it
was based upon), and types of  knowledge. Knowledge types arise from 1) the
source from which a belief  is acquired, 2) the object of  the belief  (that what the
belief  is about), and 3) the type of  knowledge. Sources of  belief  are perception,
memory, reason, testimony, and interpretation. With respect to the object of
belief, there are two relevant distinctions. The object of  belief  is legally relevant,
legal, or neither. And it is concrete or abstract. The type of  knowledge is either
factual or practical.
Together, these distinctions make up a theoretical total of  5 * 3 * 2 * 2 = 60
different types of  knowledge. Knowledge that is neither legally relevant nor
legal is not discussed in this report. Therefore, the number of  knowledge types
is reduced to 40. In case of  practical knowledge, one can hardly indicate what
the source of  that knowledge (except that it often arises from a learning proc-
ess). Therefore, the distinction among belief  sources is not made for practical
knowledge. This reduces the number of  relevant composed knowledge types to
24. An example of  such a composed knowledge type is testimonial legal con-
crete factual knowledge. This is knowledge, acquired from a newspaper, about
the classification of  a certain act of  a person as criminal negligence.
The 24 remaining knowledge types arise from a qualification step. For factual
knowledge, this qualification step applies to beliefs. In case of  practical knowl-
edge, the qualification step applies to practices. In section 6.2, I discussed five
knowledge criteria that can be employed for the qualification of  beliefs as
knowledge: truth, justification proper, reliability, consistency, and coherence.
Before I turn to a discussion of  the applicability of  these knowledge criteria to
legally relevant and legal beliefs and practices, I first summarise the way in which
these knowledge criteria interact.
6.3.2 Relations among knowledge criteria
Knowledge criteria relate to different characteristics of  a belief. A belief  has a
source and an object. The source links the belief  to its object, either directly or
indirectly. In case of  perception there is a direct link: a person perceives an ob-
ject and forms a belief  about that object. In case of  testimony there is an indi-
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rect link: a person perceives hears or sees something, which refers to a different
object. So, depending on the type of  the belief  source, the belief  source and the
belief  object may be closely related or entirely different. Both the belief  source
and the belief  object belong to the so-called ‘context of  discovery’. The ‘context
of  justification’, on the other hand, relates to those criteria that provide the
justification of  a belief.
The relations between the belief  and its source, its object, and its justification
are translated to individual knowledge criteria as follows. The reliability criterion
applies to the process by which a belief  is formed. Therefore, the nature of
reliability depends on the type of  the belief  source. Truth is the criterion that
links a belief  to its object. If  a belief  somehow corresponds to a state of  affairs
in reality, and this state of  affairs is the object of  the belief, the belief  is true.
Both reliability and truth belong to the ‘context of  discovery’. Coherence and
justification proper belong to the ‘context of  justification’. They are not about
the relation between a belief  and its object, but about giving reasons for a belief,
and the relation between the belief  and other beliefs. Although there is no strict
distinction between the ‘context of  discovery’ and the ‘context of  justification’,
using the terms may be helpful in understanding the significance of  the different
criteria. In figure 6.1, a schematical overview of  the relations among knowledge
criteria is given.
Truth
Context of discovery Context of justification
Belief source
Object Belief
Knowledge
Justification
Reliability Coherence
Consistency
Justification proper
Figure 6.1. Relations among knowledge criteria
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6.3.3 Applying the knowledge criteria
I do not discuss the qualification all 24 individual belief  types and practice types
as knowledge. However, I indicate what the general applicability of  these criteria
is. The main difference in the applicability of  knowledge criteria occurs in the
distinction between factual knowledge and practical knowledge. Most knowl-
edge criteria only apply to factual knowledge. This applies to four out of  five
knowledge criteria discussed in this report. The reliability criterion can, however,
be claimed to apply to both beliefs and practices. In case of  practices the crite-
rion means that the way in which the practice is performed, is acceptable (which
is often ‘measured’ in terms of  the general acceptability of  the outcomes of  that
practice).
With respect to factual knowledge, the applicability of  the five knowledge crite-
ria is also limited. I first discuss truth. It can easily be argued that interpretative
beliefs are not true or false, because there is no object that can support their
truth. The applicability of  truth to interpretative beliefs depends on one’s onto-
logical position with respect to the law.
Within the framework sketched in Peczenik and Hage (1999), ‘[t]he law is what
the most coherent theory of  everything says it is’. The best interpretation, part
of  that coherent theory, belongs to the domain of  epistemology. But it becomes
an ontological entity through its qualification as the best interpretation. In that
quality it is the law. Beliefs about the law then are amenable to the truth criterion.
In this view, the law exists, and thus there can be knowledge about the law.
However, the law only exists as a construction through epistemology; both
interpretations and the criteria determining what the best interpretation of  law
is, belong to the domain of  epistemology. In a natural-law view, the existence of
law (i.e., natural law) is not a construction from epistemology. Instead, natural
law’s existence is ‘truly ontological’. Applying the truth criterion to interpretative
beliefs thus becomes easier (which does not mean, of  course, that we really can
determine the truth of  actual interpretative beliefs, because we do not know
what the content of  natural law is).
Justification proper can be applied to all factual belief  types. However, its exact
definition depends on the actual belief  type involved. With respect to concrete
legally relevant beliefs for instance, the justification proper criterion largely con-
sists of  the demand that there be no defeater for some belief  arising from per-
ception. But abstract legal beliefs requires ‘better’ justification proper, i.e.,
reasons to believe some interpretation of  a formal source of  law. A procedural
justification criterion is appropriate here, because the correctness of  an inter-
pretative belief  consists largely of  its acceptance by the persons involved.
The same context dependency applies to reliability. Where reliability of  concrete
legally relevant beliefs are concerned, the criterion is truth-directed: what counts
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is the truth of  the beliefs produced by a person. But in case of  abstract legal
knowledge, reliability is defined in terms of  the general acceptability of  the
outcomes of  the practice with which the belief  is formed.
Consistency and coherence have a somewhat less context-dependent nature, i.e.,
their definition need not depend on the type of  belief  involved. This is because
of  the nature of  the consistency demand, which is a logical one, and the coher-
ence criterion, which primarily aims at covering as many beliefs as possible,
relating to as many parts of  reality as possible.
In table 6.2, I give an overview of  the potential applicability of  the different
knowledge criteria to legally relevant and legal belief  types. Please note that the
definition and the actual applicability of  the criteria varies with the ontological
stance chosen and the type of  belief  concerned.
Knowledge qualification Legally relevant belief Legal belief
Factual
belief
· truth
· justification proper
· reliability
· coherence
· consistency
· truth
· justification proper
· reliability
· coherence
· consistency
Abstract
belief
Practice · reliability · reliability
Factual
knowledge
· truth
· justification proper
· reliability
· coherence
· consistency
· truth
· justification proper
· reliability
· coherence
· consistency
Concrete
belief
Practice · reliability · reliability
Table 6.2. Potential applicability of  knowledge criteria
6.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, the following items have been discussed:
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Belief  sources in the
legal domain
Belief  sources for legally relevant belief  are percep-
tion, memory, consciousness, reason, testimony, and
interpretation. For legal belief, the relevant belief
sources are reason, testimony and interpretation.
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Types of  belief  in the
legal domain
Types of  belief  in the legal domain arise from the
different belief  sources, and the distinctions between
abstract and concrete beliefs, factual and practical
beliefs, and legally relevant and legal beliefs.
Legal knowledge
criteria
There is not a single concept of  legal knowledge:
knowledge criteria employed depend on the type of
belief  considered. The criteria discussed are the same
as for regular knowledge. However, their nature is
different for legal knowledge.
The doxastic
assumption
This assumption is rejected, because for parts of  legal
knowledge, justification cannot always be given com-
pletely in terms of  beliefs.
The externalist
assumption
For parts of  legal knowledge, it makes sense to com-
bine internalist with externalist criteria to turn belief
into knowledge.
Knowledge
qualification
The knowledge qualification of  legally relevant and
legal practices occurs through the criterion of  reli-
ability. The knowledge qualification of  legally relevant
and legal belief  occurs through applying the knowl-
edge criteria mentioned above. Not all criteria are
applicable for all belief  types. The definition of  the
criteria varies with the belief  type involved.
Table 6.3. Concluding remarks
7. Knowledge in legal information
systems
In the previous chapters, I have composed an epistemological framework for
the evaluation of  legally relevant knowledge and legal knowledge. Through a
discussion of  legal information systems, legal ontology, and epistemology, I
have explained what legal knowledge and legally relevant knowledge are. In the
current chapter, I apply the epistemological framework on the legal information
systems discussed in chapter 2. I start with an individual assessment of  legal
information systems (section 7.1). Then I discuss the role legal information
systems can play in acquiring knowledge (section 0). Finally, I make some con-
cluding remarks (section 7.3).
7.1 Individual assessment
In this section, I examine to what extent the legal information systems discussed
influence the fulfilment of  knowledge criteria. The fulfilment of  each knowl-
edge criterion is discussed with respect to the beliefs in four legal information
systems and their users. Subsequently, the belief  sources (subsection 7.1.1) and
belief  types (subsection 7.1.2) employed, and the criteria of  truth (subsection
7.1.3), justification proper (subsection 7.1.4), reliability (subsection 7.1.5), con-
sistency (subsection 7.1.6), and coherence (subsection 7.1.7) are discussed.
7.1.1 Belief sources
What belief  sources are employed in the interaction between legal information
systems and their users? To begin with, the notion of  belief  used with respect to
legal information systems needs some explanation. I regard a belief  as an imper-
sonal belief  here. Of  course I do not assume that systems really believe some-
thing to be the case. Legal information systems do not contain beliefs. Instead,
they contain represented beliefs, i.e., they contain the content of  beliefs held by
persons. If  we assume that there are such things as represented beliefs, and that
legal information systems contain such represented beliefs, we may also adapt
the notion of  belief  source to ‘source of  represented belief ’ or ‘source of  im-
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personal belief ’. However, I use the term ‘belief  source’ for such sources of
represented beliefs as well.
In subsection 6.1.1, I introduced the belief  sources that are employed for ac-
quiring legally relevant beliefs and legal beliefs: perception, memory, reason,
testimony, and interpretation. Can legal information systems be classified in
terms of  belief  sources? Beliefs acquired by someone using an information
system arise from testimony. After all, the system users read something on a
computer screen, and then they tend to believe what they read. This can be
compared to the situation in which a person is told p or reads p in a newspaper,
and believes p as a consequence.
Which sources can be distinguished for the (represented) beliefs in the systems?
These are memory, reason, and testimony. Memory functions as a recall of  pre-
viously stored information in the system. Making deductive and inductive infer-
ences with beliefs means employing reason as a belief  source. Testimony plays
an important role in legal information systems: beliefs represented in such sys-
tems are derived from testimony as well: represented beliefs entered by system
engineers are testimonial beliefs. Perception, consciousness, and interpretation
are not employed as belief  sources in legal information systems.
7.1.2 Belief types
Types of  belief  in the legal domain arise from the different belief  sources, and
the distinctions between abstract and concrete beliefs, factual beliefs and prac-
tice, and legally relevant and legal beliefs. Following these distinctions, all infor-
mation systems discussed contain testimonial beliefs. In addition, they contain
reasoned beliefs (they perform fixed procedures on the testimonial beliefs they
contain), and memorial beliefs (but these are, due to the reliable nature of  com-
puter memory, equal to the testimonial beliefs or the reasoned beliefs they were
based on). They do not contain perceptual beliefs because they do not perceive
their surroundings themselves. And they do not contain interpretative beliefs
because the procedures they employ for drawing conclusions are defined clearly
and do not involve interpretation. However, the testimonial beliefs they contain
are about perceptual beliefs, memorial beliefs, reasoned beliefs, testimonial beliefs
and interpretative beliefs.
The second distinction is between abstract and concrete beliefs. All legal infor-
mation systems contain both types: for instance, abstract beliefs about applica-
ble rules, and concrete beliefs about the case at hand. The third distinction is
between factual beliefs and practice. Legal information contain factual beliefs. If
we assume that practice is internalised in human beings, and that, if  such prac-
tice can be made explicit, it becomes factual belief, then legal information sys-
tems do not perform practice. The third distinction is between legally relevant
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and legal belief. Legal information systems contain both types: they contain
beliefs about factual aspects of  cases as well as beliefs about, e.g., legal norms.
From these general remarks we may conclude that legal information systems
contain eight types of  legal belief  (reason and interpretation times abstract and
concrete times legally relevant and legal).
What are the belief  types contained in the individual legal information systems?
The database of  IVS contains testimonial beliefs about sanctions imposed in the
past. Beliefs produced by the system itself  are derived by case-based reasoning
techniques and statistical methods. I categorise these beliefs as reasoned beliefs.
Knowledge criteria with respect to IVS thus apply to testimonial and reasoned
beliefs.
ESM and TESSEC contain testimonial beliefs with respect to the content of
regulations, and they are provided with testimonial beliefs about a case by the
user. The conclusions provided by ESM and TESSEC can be classified as reasoned
beliefs. It should be noted that representations of  regulations have always been
subject to some form of  interpretation: formal representations are never equal
to their natural-language representation objects. These interpretative beliefs are
held by the system-engineer, and they become testimonial beliefs in the system
itself. Thus, the source of  these beliefs is testimony, but their object consists of
interpretations.
Part of  LEDA falls outside the scope of  the evaluation in terms of  (represented)
beliefs. LEDA contains the text of  the Directives, and this representation can be
characterised as testimonial belief. However, the hypertext structure imposed on
the text of  the Directives and the conceptual grammar cannot be classified in
terms of  beliefs.
Not only the beliefs in the legal information systems themselves are relevant.
User beliefs are subject to knowledge criteria as well, and legal information
systems can help fulfil these criteria. Users have perceptual beliefs, testimonial
beliefs, and interpretative beliefs. They may acquire them either by using the
system alone (testimonial beliefs, based on ‘what the system says’), or by using
the system, combined with their own contribution (interpretative beliefs). In
case of  ESM and TESSEC, belief  acquisition is based on the first route, in case of
IVS and LEDA, the second route applies.
7.1.3 Truth
Truth, considered as correspondence, applies to all testimonial and reasoned
beliefs, and is thus relevant with respect to beliefs represented in legal informa-
tion systems. Below, I give a detailed discussion of  the applicability of  the truth
criterion to the beliefs in the four legal information systems.
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In IVS, the truth criterion mainly holds with respect to beliefs whose objects
consist of  sanctions imposed in the past. These sanctions belong to the second
level of  the ontology of  law adopted in section 3.3. IVS is based on models,
which define entities and relations among them. They are meant to represent the
part of  reality relevant to the system and its goals. The models constituting IVS
are not amenable to truth; the determination of  facts and factors relevant for
the sentencing, their values, and the preference relations between them, partly
depend on the individual opinions of  judges and the builder of  the system.
Thus, truth with respect to an testimonial belief  can be established, but this
testimonial belief  is probably about a different, interpretative, belief, to which
truth does not apply.
Both in ESM and TESSEC, truth is implicitly supposed to be applicable to all
factual data (testimonial beliefs). By applying valid inferences on true data, true
conclusions are drawn (reasoned beliefs). If  the truth criterion were not appli-
cable, the systems could not work in a sensible way; their entire functioning is
based on the assumption that we can establish the truth of  propositions, and
thus make deductive inferences (or, in the case of  ESM ‘reasonable’ inferences).
In LEDA, the testimonial beliefs representing the Directives are subject to the
truth criterion as well, but these form only a minor part of  the system.
Users of  legal information systems have to assume the testimonial beliefs they
acquire through those systems, are true. They can support this assumption by
fulfilling other knowledge criteria for the current belief, thus increasing justifica-
tion for that belief. In most cases, users will simply presuppose the truth of  the
beliefs they acquire by using the system. This is especially misleading when these
beliefs are ultimately based on interpretative beliefs, as truth may not be appli-
cable to such beliefs.
7.1.4 Justification proper
IVS is chiefly a means of  providing justification proper, i.e., giving good reasons
for some view. In the case of  IVS, these reasons are arguments that have been
given before to motivate a decision on a sanction. To improve the equality of
sentencing means, in the view of  the builders of  IVS, to improve the quality of
motivation for those sentences. Those motivations help the user of  the system
to assess why a specific sentence has been imposed in the past, and how that
helps her to determine a sentence in the present case. The goal of  the system
thus demands better justification for its content. The system itself  helps to es-
tablish better justification by asking the user to give reasons for her decision,
when such a decision is added to the case file. Those reasons, however, are
partly dependent on the model of  the domain. By determining the framework
within which the system is built, providing reasons is limited to reasons that fit
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in with the framework. An advantage of  such an approach is that the reasoning
process is structured, which yields uniform argumentation. A disadvantage is
that arguments are always based upon the same framework, which limits the
creativity (and maybe the quality) of  the argumentation.
Justification proper is an important function of  ESM as well, but here it amounts
to internal or deductive justification. It is attained by clarifying the rules by which
inferences are made, and showing the data used for the inferences, and it only
backs the actual inferences made. This clarifying function is called ‘how’, and it
does not explicitly claim to justify the result of  an inference. However, it is re-
lated to the legitimisation criterion that De Vey Mestdagh (1998, p. 8) formu-
lates. This criterion consists of  the demands of  legality, rationality, motivation
and publicity, and it applies to legal decisions. The demand of  legality says that a
decision should be based on a valid rule of  law. Rationality is understood as the
presence of  a complete and consistent argumentation. The demand of motiva-
tion says that a decision should also indicate the grounds it is based on. The
demand of  publicity says that a decision should be made known in writing or
verbally. The how function serves the second and third demand: it provides an
overview of  the argumentation process and it gives the grounds for that argu-
mentation. It thus also constitutes, to a limited extent, justification proper and
coherence.
In TESSEC, like in ESM, only internal justification is provided: the proof  function
shows which rules are applied and the why function gives some explanation on
the nature of  the questions asked.
The main object of  justification in LEDA is the regulation that is under con-
struction. This regulation does not exist prior to its drafting by the user; the
justification thus concerns a new object. LEDA provides the means to increase
the quality of  a regulation. Justification proper is raised by providing the con-
tents of  the Directives in an accessible manner. If  the newly drafted regulation
meets the criteria provided by LEDA, and if  these criteria adequately match the
contents of  the Directives, the justification of  beliefs about the new regulation
will consist in the agreement with the contents of  the Directives.
Justification, be it justification proper or internal justification, can be transferred
from a system to its users. This is obviously what IVS, ESM and TESSEC do: IVS
shows data that can be employed as reasons to justify some belief  about a sen-
tence, and ESM and TESSEC show how they derive their ‘decisions’. Those rea-
sons and derivations can be employed by users to justify their own beliefs as
well.
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7.1.5 Reliability
Reliability of  perceptual beliefs is not influenced by IVS: it does not serve as an
intermediary between the perceiver and the object perceived. The reliability of
testimonial beliefs, based on perceptual beliefs, depends on the accuracy with
which data are entered in the system. It suffices to state that reliability of  repre-
sented perceptual beliefs is relatively high: the chance that a sanction is repre-
sented inadequately can be easily reduced by taking practical precautions. There
is, however, the class of  beliefs about the reasons for a specific sentence. Those
beliefs are not established solely by the judge herself. They are established in
accordance with the sentencing model developed for IVS. The reliability of  these
beliefs can only be assessed by the reliability criterion rephrased for legal beliefs
(a legal belief  is acquired in a reliable manner whenever the route by which it is
acquired is acceptable by the standards in a given legal and social context).
IVS influences the reliability of  reasoned beliefs in two ways. Reliability applies
to both inference steps. First, it makes inferences itself: the system compares
cases with a case-based reasoning approach, and presents the results. The user
herself  provides most of  the premises for the inference made by IVS. The deci-
sion whether a case is similar to the given case is made by IVS. The measure for
similarity is not that transparent: most users do not know what algorithms are
employed. However, they should be aware of  the elements that serve to make
the comparison, as the comparison probably influences their decisions.
Second, the user makes an inference, i.e., she makes decisions partly on the basis
of  the results of  IVS. She can draw her own conclusions on the basis of  the
conclusions offered by IVS. The reliability of  this inference step is subject to the
reliability criterion rephrased for legal beliefs: the acquisition of  beliefs by em-
ploying IVS is acceptable if  IVS is sufficiently well embedded in the decision
process.
As in the case of  IVS, reliability of  perceptual beliefs is not influenced by ESM.
The reliability of  the testimonial beliefs represented in the system depends on
the accuracy with which data are entered in the system, as is the case with IVS.
But, contrary to IVS, these beliefs may play a crucial role in the actual decision
process. If  ESM is used to take over the decision process, decisions are actually
based on these beliefs. If  they are false, the decision will probably be false.
ESM is primarily meant for producing reasoned beliefs. The premises for the
inferences made are partly given by the user herself, by supplying data, and
partly by the system, from its databases. The reliability of  reasoned beliefs de-
pends on the inference method used, and the agreement of  this method with
comparable procedures followed when users make decisions themselves. The
inference method employed is part of  the logic of  reasonable inference. Infer-
ences are made from subsets of  the data in the system.
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The same remarks as for ESM apply to TESSEC, except that standard proposition
logic is used, instead of  the logic of  reasonable inference. Conclusions are thus
true whenever the data are true on which these conclusions are based. The reli-
ability of  the system itself  is not an interesting subject in as far as we consider
the inferences made: the reliability of  deductive inferences is 100%. However,
we may also consider the acceptability of  the inferences by the alternative defini-
tion of  reliability. In that case, we may even argue that deductive inference is not
the proper way to infer legal conclusions.
LEDA increases the reliability of  beliefs about the contents of  the Directives
insofar as the system is able to clarify these contents for the user. An external
evaluation of  the reliability measure could be performed by testing knowledge
about the Directives in two groups, one using the system, the other not using it.
It is harder to assess the correctness of  beliefs about the Directives than to
assess the correctness of  perceptual beliefs, because the former category of
beliefs are to a large extent the result of  interpretation. In case there is a uni-
form interpretation of  the contents of  the Directives, the reliability criterion can
be applied. In that case LEDA increases the reliability of  beliefs about the Direc-
tives’ contents.
In all systems, the reliability of  reasoned beliefs is high. The acquisition routes,
as far as they are limited to the systems themselves, are very reliable. Computers
rarely make mistakes when they are properly programmed, so they strictly ad-
here to the procedures that were defined to yield reasoned beliefs. If  we re-
phrase the reliability criterion to match the acceptability of  the acquisition route,
the reliability of  reasoned beliefs in such systems (especially in decision-making
systems) may decrease considerably. Is the inference method employed a proper
method, considering the nature of  the domain? Legal practice and legal theory
should come up with an answer to this question.
The reliability of  user beliefs acquired through system beliefs is a function of
the reliability of  the systems involved in producing those beliefs. If  the reliability
of  the system is 95%, and the reliability of  its user is 95% as well, then the reli-
ability of  the user belief  is 0.95 times 0.95 is 0.9025 (provided the two reliability
measures are independent). With the rephrased reliability criterion, such a cal-
culation cannot easily be made. In that case, the acceptability of  the acquisition
route for the belief  is assessed in qualitative terms: is it acceptable in a legal
context that a user makes a decision on the basis of  beliefs acquired from a legal
information system?
7.1.6 Consistency
It is not a goal of  IVS to maintain consistency in its case file. The system gives
the opportunity to improve the equality of  sentencing, but this is not the kind of
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consistency meant here. Logical consistency of  the system is attained by not
allowing characteristics at the same time to hold and not to hold for a certain
case. The structure of  the database often ensures that this cannot be the case.
The consistency of  sentencing is improved by proper use of  the information
system.
A premise of  the theory behind ESM is that consistency of  its data is not taken
as a premise. In standard first order predicate logic this would lead to the possi-
bility of  deriving any proposition. The introduction of  the notion of  reasonable
inference allows us to make valid inferences from limited sets of  assumptions,
and prevents undesirable consequences arising from the inconsistency of  prem-
ises (in standard logic, anything can be derived from inconsistent premises).
As standard proposition logic is used, consistency is taken as a premise for the
belief  content of  TESSEC.
LEDA provides some tools to check the contents of  the newly written regula-
tion. These checks can avoid inconsistency of  that regulation with the contents
of  the Directives. Insofar as the Directives are meant to increase consistency in
regulations, this is reflected in the regulations produced with the help of  LEDA,
i.e., if  the system is used properly.
Consistency is checked among two or more beliefs. If  a system belief  is consis-
tent with other beliefs in the system, a user belief  based on that system belief
need not be consistent with other beliefs held by the user.
7.1.7 Coherence
Coherence amounts to mutual interdependence of  statements. IVS enhances
coherence through its underlying model: the coherence of  sentences increases
with the convergence of  justification statements. As justification statements are
structured through IVS, the system tends to support coherence. On the other
hand, the system leaves open the possibility of  diverging motivations. Its appli-
cation probably tends to increase coherence in sentencing, but to verify this
assumption, an empirical study is necessary when the system is in actual use.
As with IVS, ESM and TESSEC tend to increase coherence among decisions. The
systems yields (exemplar) decisions, and in this respect it differs from IVS, which
only shows similar cases. Coherence among decisions is increased by the appli-
cation of  rules to facts. The rules are supplied by the system itself. As these
rules remain the same, decisions based on those rules tend to cohere. The facts
to which the rules are applied, are supplied by the user. The form in which facts
are represented, is largely controlled by the system.
If  LEDA is applied successfully, coherence among regulations will increase: leg-
islators will draft regulations that cohere with the Directives, and if  they cohere
with the Directives, they will cohere with each other.
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Coherence applies to a set of  beliefs. Coherence among system beliefs need not
imply coherence among user beliefs. Only when the body of  beliefs held by a
system is similar to the body of  beliefs held by a user, coherence applies to the
user belief  as well.
7.1.8 Overview
In the tables below, an overview of  the four systems is given.
Overview of  IVS
Goal To make visible the current sentencing practice in
order to help the judge sentence in an individual
case and reduce dissimilarities in sanctions.
Functions Registration, selection, maintenance.
Techniques Statistical: k-Nearest Neighbour algorithm, case-
based reasoning: model according to Com-
monKADS.
Knowledge criteria Remarks
Truth Applies (ideally) to testimonial and reasoned beliefs.
Justification Reasons are provided for a specific sentence. These
can be applied in the case at hand. Objects of  justi-
fication are primarily user beliefs.
Reliability Applies to the way inferences are made within the
system.
Consistency Is ensured in most cases by the structure of  the
database.
Coherence Tends to be increased as a result of  applying the
system (consistency of  arguments).
Table 7.1. Overview of  IVS
Overview of  ESM
Goal To provide a reconstruction of  the decision process
underlying the issuing of  permits in environmental
law.
Functions Facts, rules, save, explanation, how.
Techniques Logic of  reasonable inference.
Knowledge criteria Remarks
Truth Applies (ideally) to testimonial and reasoned beliefs.
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Justification Deductive justification.
Reliability Applies to the way inferences are made within the
system.
Consistency Not applied (on purpose).
Coherence Tends to be increased as a result of  applying the
system.
Table 7.2. Overview of  ESM
Overview of  TESSEC
Goal Increasing the percentage of  correctness of  deci-
sions made about the execution of  social security
acts.
Functions Providing explanation, providing proof, providing
reasons.
Techniques Backward-chaining inferences on production rules
and facts.
Knowledge criteria Remarks
Truth Applies (ideally) to testimonial and reasoned beliefs.
Justification No additional reasons are provided: the justification
is given by the inference procedure followed and the
data used for it (deductive justification).
Reliability Reliability of  decisions increases as a consequence
of  applying the system.
Consistency Is a premise of  the logic adopted.
Coherence Tends to be increased as a result of  applying the
system.
Table 7.3. Overview of  TESSEC
Overview of  LEDA
Goal Increasing the quality of  legislation by providing
easy access to the contents of  the Directives.
Functions Structure information by hypertext indexes, content
information by pattern recognition.
Techniques Hypertext, pattern recognition.
Knowledge criteria Remarks
Truth Applies (ideally) to testimonial beliefs.
Justification By increasing the adherence of  new regulations to
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the Directives
Reliability Applies to the method employed for drafting regu-
lations.
Consistency Influenced indirectly; by avoiding inconsistency
between new regulations and the Directives (but
these should be consistent themselves).
Coherence Among new drafted regulations.
Table 7.4. Overview of  LEDA
7.2 Legal information systems: a source of knowledge?
The problem definition of  this report was twofold: can legal information sys-
tems be considered as a source of  knowledge for the law? And: what are the
implications of  the existence of  legal information systems for the demands that
should be imposed upon legal justification? A provisional answer to the first
part of  the problem definition is as follows. A legal information system can be
regarded as a source of  belief, i.e., we can acquire beliefs by using the system, and
we can also fulfil some of  the knowledge criteria applicable to those beliefs.
Ideally, the system gives us all the information needed to qualify a belief  as
knowledge. In that case, the system can be regarded as a source of  knowledge. Ìf
the object of  this knowledge is the legal domain, the system is a source of  legally
relevant or legal knowledge.
A provisional answer to the second part of  the problem definition is: justifica-
tion demands partly depend on the means of  justification available. When there
are better means to verify some fact, these means will probably be employed.
For instance, information systems could be introduced that enable us to com-
pare more cases to the current one. Such systems may cause us to increase or
alter our justification demands.
Both parts of  the problem definition are elaborated on below. In subsection
7.2.1, I discuss the question whether legal information systems can be regarded
as a formal or material source of  law. In subsection 7.2.2, I discuss the relevance
of  the doxastic and the externalist assumption to knowledge in the legal do-
main. In subsection 7.2.3, I try to answer the question whether legal information
systems contain knowledge. Subsection 7.2.4 is dedicated to the question how
knowledge can be transferred from legal information systems to their users. In
subsection 7.2.5, finally, the role of  legal information systems in legal justifica-
tion is discussed.
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7.2.1 Formal and material sources of law
Can legal information systems be regarded as a formal source of  law? The an-
swer is simple: no. There is a reasonably clear definition of what formal sources
of  law we are to distinguish: statute law, treaties, customary law, and legal prece-
dents. Legal information can, of  course, provide the user with knowledge about
statute law, treaties, customary law, and legal precedents. But the category of
legal information systems does not belong in the enumeration. They only con-
tain representations of  the formal sources of  law. Can legal information systems
be regarded as a material source of  law? The answer is somewhat less simple, but
still: no. Van Duyvendijk (1989, p. 20) lists the following so-called material
sources of  law: political powers, civil servants, pressuregroups, religious beliefs,
moral beliefs, social-economical developments, geographical circumstances, and
technological developments. The nature of  legal information systems is differ-
ent from these material sources of  law. Material sources of  law are factors that
play a role in interpreting formal sources of  law. Legal information systems may
contain (again) representations of  such sources.
We are still a long way from regarding legal information systems as part of  this
list, which would result in statements like ‘taking into regard the moral views,
political opinions and the output of  our legal information systems, we should
interpret this law text in such and such way’. However, legal information sys-
tems can be regarded as knowledge sources for the law. They are a suitable means for
acquiring knowledge about the law. In what ways are they? Legal information
systems provide beliefs or knowledge to their users mainly via testimony, i.e., the
users of  a legal information system acquire beliefs or knowledge of  law because
they are ‘told’ things by the system. They acquire perceptual beliefs about the
literal content of  those things, and they acquire testimonial beliefs about the
bearing these things have on reality. Depending on our definition of  knowledge
and on the character of  the system, they may even acquire knowledge.
7.2.2 The basic assumptions of epistemology
In section 6.2, I discussed, among other things, the application of  the doxastic
assumption and the externalist assumption to legally relevant knowledge and
legal knowledge. Both assumptions are important to answering the question in
what way legal information systems can function as a source of  knowledge. The
doxastic assumption says that justification is ultimately achieved in the form of
other beliefs. This assumption was rejected. All current legal information sys-
tems (at least those discussed in this report), however, completely function on
the basis of  propositional information (impersonal beliefs or represented be-
liefs). The link to nondoxastic sources of  belief  can only be established via hu-
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man intervention: the system engineer or the system user adds represented be-
liefs to the system. Although in the legal domain the larger part of  justification
consists in providing reasons, and it thus fits in with the doxastic assumption,
there is still a connection with non-doxastic belief  sources.
The externalist assumption says that justification is attained externally, i.e., inde-
pendent of  internal states of  a person. Externalism can be combined with in-
ternalism; we may adopt externalist criteria and internalist criteria at the same
time. A combination of  justification proper and reliability, the first providing
justification in terms of  internal states, and the second providing justification in
terms of  externalist factors, may lead to conflicts. These conflicts, however, are
no different on principle from justification conflicts within either a completely
internalist or a completely externalist justification attempt. The externalist as-
sumption (or its counterpart, the internalist assumption) is relevant to legal
information systems as well. If  there exists something like ‘external justification’,
in the form of  some kind of  reliability or probability measure, legal information
systems may help to increase the fulfilment of  that measure.
A definition of  knowledge may thus contain both internalist criteria (justifica-
tion proper, coherence), and externalist criteria (truth, reliability). For a person
to be justified to believe something (say, p), could mean not only having good
reasons for that belief, but also to adopt the externalist criterion of  reliability.
She could adopt the belief  that her own cognitive system yields beliefs like the
belief  p reliably (i.e., in most cases the belief  p is produced by her cognitive sys-
tem, it is true). The former belief  would be a reason to believe p.
Given these conclusions about a concept of  knowledge, what role can legal
information systems play in acquiring knowledge? They can both provide beliefs
and fulfil knowledge criteria for those beliefs. By employing the non-doxastic
and the externalist assumptions, the justification of  a user belief  can be pro-
vided by a legal information system. A belief  I acquire from the system may be
justified properly (the system provides good reasons), and it can be acquired
reliably (the system guarantees the reliability of  the acquisition route of  the
belief).
7.2.3 Knowledge in legal information systems
The typology of  knowledge in the legal domain (cf. section 4.5) provides us with
the distinctions on the basis of which we can assess the content of  legal infor-
mation systems. In subsection 7.1.2, I indicated which belief  types can be found
in such systems. If  these belief  types can be qualified as knowledge, a system
contains the corresponding knowledge types. So, if  the system contains a con-
crete factual legal belief, and it complies with all applicable knowledge criteria (cf.
subsection 6.3.3), it is a piece of  knowledge. In practice, the actual qualification
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of  beliefs as knowledge can hardly be attained by a legal information system
alone. None of  the four systems discussed succeed in complying with all appli-
cable criteria: justification proper is provided, but only to a limited degree; reli-
ability of  perceptual beliefs, needed to determine the reliability of  the
testimonial beliefs, is not determined; and there is no internal measure for co-
herence. And because there is no knowledge, it cannot be transferred to the user
either.
Although they are not capable of  transferring knowledge (as yet), legal informa-
tion systems can help to fulfil knowledge criteria for beliefs held by their users.
This is the subject of  the next subsection.
7.2.4 Knowledge transfer
Transfer plays a central role in the question whether legal information systems
can play a role as a source of  knowledge for the law. A user can acquire beliefs,
based on the beliefs represented in the system, by testimony. She can also ac-
quire beliefs about fulfilled or unfulfilled knowledge criteria. In section 7.1, I
discussed the fulfilment of  knowledge criteria for beliefs represented in the
systems. I also examined whether fulfilled knowledge criteria also apply to trans-
ferred beliefs, i.e., testimonial beliefs, based on those system beliefs. Below, I
discuss how the fulfilment of  a certain knowledge criterion that applies to a
belief  p can be retained when the belief  it applies to is transferred to a belief  p’
by testimony.
Truth is retained in two cases. First, assume that a belief  p’ is based on a belief  p
by testimony, and p’ and p have the same content. Then, if  p is true, p’ is true as
well (provided that no contextual parameters are present in p, making its truth
dependent on, e.g., the person who has the belief). Second, in a reasoning proc-
ess, truth can be retained, most notably in the case of  deduction. If  a belief  is
about a different belief  (for instance in the case of  a perceptual belief  about an
testimonial belief), the truth of  the former has little or nothing to do with the
truth of  the latter. The information about the truth of  a belief  has to be trans-
ferred, as well as the belief  itself. Note that the actual truth of  a belief  is not a
function of  other beliefs, but of  the relation between the belief  and reality.
Justification proper can be retained under certain conditions. Reasons, consti-
tuting the justification, can be transferred from one person to another. The
distinction between personal and impersonal justification is relevant here. There
can be reasons that justify me in believing that p, but do not justify someone else
in believing that p. For example, if  Peter tells me that it is 8 am, then I may be
justified in believing so for the reasons that he told me, but it does not justify
Henry in believing that it is 8 am, because he lives in Australia. If  a reason is
made independent of most contextual parameters, it can be employed by differ-
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ent persons, and it supports impersonal justification. Personal justification can
be transferred if  the reasons for one person to believe that p are also reasons for
the other person to believe that p. Impersonal justification can always be trans-
ferred. Legal information systems can help in the process of  transfer by show-
ing reasons for a certain statement.
Reliability is retained only to the extent allowed by the current transmission step.
If  the reliability of  belief  acquisition in a legal information system is 0.9, and my
own reliability in acquiring beliefs on the basis of  testimony is 0.9, the resulting
reliability of my testimonial belief  is 0.9 * 0.9 = 0.81 (cf. subsection 7.1.5). Legal
information systems can provide information about their own reliability, about
the reliability of  their sources, and even about the general reliability of  their
users. Currently, this information cannot be calculated by the systems them-
selves.
Consistency and coherence are both evaluated within sets of  beliefs. Therefore,
the fulfilment of  these criteria is only retained if  the whole body of  beliefs
remains the same. This condition is not fulfilled if  a person acquires a belief
from a legal information system.
7.2.5 The role of legal information systems in legal justification
The introduction of  legal information systems inevitably has an effect on the
issue of  legal justification. The legal domain has its own standards of  justifica-
tion. We may define legal justification as the justification demands with respect
to procedure and proof  that can be derived from formal and material sources of
law. The demands imposed in legal justification always depend on the means
available at that time for providing justification. Genetic fingerprints may nowa-
days be a means of  proving someone’s guilt or innocence, whereas ten years
ago, such fingerprints were not available. The availability of  such means may
alter the general character of  legal justification as well: for instance, there may be
a demand for a higher number of  independent sources of  evidence.
The introduction of  legal information systems can have such consequences as
well. They may alter the structure of  justification. Legal information systems
provide the means to implement difficult processes. Legal information systems
may also alter the content of  justification. The search facilities in a database may
result in the use of  a different type of  arguments, for instance the use of  statis-
tical data. The use of  databases may also lead to the frequent employment of
arguments based on past events.
Current demands regarding structure and content of  legal justification can form
the basis for the building of  legal information systems. But the introduction of
such systems should not be regarded as a neutral event. Explicit or implicit
choices regarding the ontology of  law and the structure of  the domain inevita-
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bly have an influence on the actual use of  the system in that domain. The
structure and the content of  legal justification may be subject to change. This is
not a bad thing in itself. However, the changes brought about by the introduc-
tion of  legal information systems should be transparent to all persons and in-
stitutions involved in using those systems.
What concrete possibilities in the area of  legal justification are offered by the
introduction of  legal information systems? The following items are examples of
the consequences of  employing such systems:
· Comparable cases can be found more easily. This impels us to learn about
more cases to justify a decision.
· Decision processes can be followed more accurately. Overall reliability thus
increases. This might, however, decrease flexibility in the consideration of
events deviating from the normal procedure.
· The introduction of  decision-making legal information systems requires us
to provide accurate and precise formulations of  rules and cases. There is a
tendency to reduce the acts of  interpretation and classification to the elimi-
nation of  vague terms.. This may increase legal certainty, but it also encour-
ages rigidity.
7.3 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, the following items have been discussed:
Item discussed Intermediate conclusions
Belief  sources The sources employed by legal information systems
are testimony, memory and reason. Users of  such
systems employ testimony as a source of  belief. Or
they employ reason and interpretation, if  they use
the advice of  a legal information system only as one
of  several sources for their own reasoning and inter-
preting.
Belief  types Legal information systems contain testimonial beliefs
and reasoned beliefs, abstract and concete beliefs,
and legally relevant and legal beliefs.
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Fulfilling knowledge
criteria in legal infor-
mation systems and
their users
Predominantly, legal information systems fulfil ele-
ments of  the justification criterion. In IVS, justifica-
tion takes the form of  providing reasons for a user
decision. In ESM and TESSEC, so-called internal justi-
fication for the decision is provided. In LEDA, rea-
sons are provided for drafting a legal regulation in a
certain way. The degree to which other criteria (reli-
ability, consistency, coherence) are fulfilled, is raised
only as a side effect.
Table 7.5. Concluding remarks
8. Conclusions
In this chapter, I provide a summary of  the report (section 8.1). In addition, I
draw conclusions (section 8.2), and I provide suggestions for further research
(section 8.3).
8.1 Summary
In this report, I gave an overview of  the applicability of  epistemic criteria to
legal information systems to find out whether legal information systems can be
regarded as a source of  knowledge.
In chapter 1, I introduced the problem to be discussed and the research ques-
tions. The problem amounts to the following: legal information systems contain
representations of  relevant parts of  reality. Sometimes it is claimed they contain
representations of  knowledge, or even contain knowledge. People use these
systems to acquire beliefs on a subject that they do not yet have information on.
Or they use these systems to guide them through a decision process. By using
the system, their own beliefs tend to be influenced. If we have a belief  and
certain criteria are fulfilled, we may qualify that belief  as knowledge. These crite-
ria are called knowledge criteria. The problem definition was: to what extent and
under what conditions can legal information systems be considered as a source
of  knowledge for the law? And: what are the implications of  the existence of
legal information systems for the demands that should be imposed upon legal
justification?
In chapter 2, I discussed different types of  legal information systems, the legal
tasks they may be used for, and the knowledge users of  legal information sys-
tems need. Legal information systems may contribute to performing different
legal tasks: application of  legal rules to cases, legislative drafting. and systemati-
sation. As an example, I discussed the goal, functions, and techniques of  four
legal information systems: IVS, ESM, TESSEC, and LEDA.
In chapter 3, I dealt with the ontology of  law. I listed different theories about
the ontological status of  the law, and I clarified the distinction between the law
and knowledge about the law. In addition, I made a distinction among three
ontological levels in the legal domain: the level of  non-legal entities, the level of
established legal entities (whose existence is constituted by institutional and
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conventional rules), and the level of  non-established legal entities (whose exis-
tence is constituted only by reasons).
In chapter 4, I discussed legal knowledge. After a general introduction to the
point of  view adopted, I dealt with the relation between sources of  law and
knowledge of  the law, and the relation between interpretations and knowledge
of  the law. Next, I dealt with the concept of  legal knowledge in different theo-
ries of  law (among which hermeneutic theories). I concluded the chapter with a
typology of  knowledge in the legal domain. This typology is based on the fol-
lowing distinctions: between legal knowledge: legally relevant versus legal
knowledge, abstract versus concrete knowledge, and factual knowledge (‘know-
ing that’) versus practice. (‘knowing how’).
In chapter 5, I discussed regular knowledge. I focused on the following issues.
First, the issue where our beliefs come from: what sources of  belief  and knowl-
edge can we distinguish? The following belief  sources were identified: percep-
tion, memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony. Second, the issue whether
the justification of  a belief  is given completely in terms of  other beliefs. Third,
the issue whether justification is given completely in terms of  internal states (i.e.,
beliefs and other events in our brains), or in terms of  externalist factors (like the
reliability of  our cognitive system). Fourth, individual knowledge criteria are
discussed extensively. The relations among these knowledge criteria were clari-
fied.
In chapter 6, I compared knowledge in the legal domain with regular knowledge.
Knowledge in the legal domain includes legal knowledge and legally relevant
knowledge. First, I focused on the question what belief  sources and belief  types
can be distinguished in the legal domain. Then, I examined how the five knowl-
edge criteria discussed in chapter 5 can be adjusted to the legal domain. After
this, I answered the question whether the doxastic assumption and the external-
ist assumption apply to legal knowledge. Finally, I centered on the question
under what conditions beliefs and practices in the legal domain can be qualified
as knowledge.
Finally, in chapter 7, I applied the ideas developed in the previous chapters to
legal information systems. For each of  the four systems discussed, I identified
(1) the belief  sources and belief  types employed, and (2) the way in which it
helps to fulfil knowledge criteria. Subsequently, I answered the question to what
extent and in what way legal information systems can be regarded as a source of
knowledge for the law.
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8.2 Conclusions
The conclusions in this section are given as answers to the research questions
and the problem definition. After these answers, some general conclusions are
provided.
Question: What types of  knowledge should we distinguish in the legal domain?
Answer: Various distinctions are relevant for a typology of  knowledge in the
legal domain. With respect to the object of  knowledge in the legal domain, I
distinguish between legally relevant and legal knowledge, and between abstract
and concrete knowledge. With respect to the nature of  knowledge in the legal
domain, I distinguish between factual and practical knowledge. With respect to
the source of  knowledge in the legal domain, I distinguish among knowledge
based on perception, memory, reason, testimony, and interpretation. These
knowledge types result from the qualification of  beliefs and practices as knowl-
edge. Different sets of  knowledge criteria are needed for this qualification.
Question: In the philosophical discipline of  epistemology, what criteria determine
whether some belief  is knowledge?
Answer: The knowledge criteria discussed in this report are truth, justification,
reliability, consistency, and coherence. These are not the only criteria, but
probably the most important ones. The answer what criteria are employed is
related to the distinctions between doxastic and non-doxastic theories, and in-
ternalist and externalist theories. Doxastic theories do not take into account
other factors than mere beliefs in bridging the gap between belief  and knowl-
edge, and are thus rejected. The division between internalism and externalism is
artificial; internalist and externalist criteria can be employed at the same time.
Externalist criteria can be reduced to internalist criteria so as to save internalism,
but this does not do justice to the nature of  externalist criteria.
Question: Are criteria in the legal domain different from the criteria employed in
general epistemology?
Answer: Nominally, the same knowledge criteria can be applied for knowledge in
the legal domain as for regular knowledge. In a legal setting, however, the nature
of  these criteria may differ. Also, the applicability of  specific knowledge criteria
depends on the type of  belief  under consideration. Truth, for instance, can be
applied to some belief  types, and not to others. Beliefs whose objects are inter-
pretations, are not amenable to truth. Justification proper of  legal beliefs may be
subject to legal rules regarding procedure and content of  reasons.
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Question: What role can legal information systems play in fulfilling these criteria?
Answer: Different types of  beliefs ask for different knowledge criteria to be
fulfilled to become knowledge. Thus, the role a legal information system can
play in fulfilling knowledge criteria depends on the belief  type involved. Also,
we have to distinguish between beliefs in legal information systems and beliefs
held by their users. The fulfilment of  knowledge criteria in individual legal in-
formation systems is as follows. As truth is a definitional criterion, not a practi-
cally applicable one, we can only say that truth is deemed applicable to large parts
of  the belief  content of  legal information systems. But if  a particular belief  is
based upon some arbitrary modelling choice, truth is probably not applicable.
Justification proper is only provided by IVS: this system provides reasons for a
certain decision. ESM and TESSEC only provide deductive justification. LEDA
does not provide any form of  explicit justification. Reliability of  inferences
made by the legal information systems discussed is high. But if  we rephrase
reliability into acceptability of  the acquisition route for beliefs, the inference
engines in legal information systems may not comply with the criterion. Con-
sistency of  represented beliefs is not guaranteed by any of  the systems, but it is
presupposed by TESSEC. IVS, ESM and TESSEC increase coherence for the beliefs
represented in the systems. In IVS, this is attained by a detour: sanctions based
on the use of  IVS are represented in the system, and these can be used again for
future decisions. ESM and TESSEC tend to increase coherence of  represented
beliefs through the application of  a fixed set of  rules. LEDA tends to increase
coherence of  regulations produced by employing the system properly.
Question: To what extent and under what conditions can legal information sys-
tems be considered as a source of  knowledge for the law?
Answer: From the viewpoint of  belief sources, a legal information system can be
seen as providing testimonial beliefs to its user: the information system provides
beliefs that were earlier stored in it by other people. The testimonial view of
information systems works as long as the system is a black box and it does not
provide any ‘new’ information. If  it makes inferences itself, and shows this
process to its user, we may say that the belief  source is reason. A legal informa-
tion system may also be seen as a knowledge source, but this requires, I claim, that
the system also provides fulfilment of  the applicable knowledge criteria. Alter-
natively, the system is a source of  beliefs, and the fulfilment of  applicable
knowledge criteria depends (partly) on sources other than the system.
Question: What are the implications of  the existence of  legal information systems
for the demands that should be imposed upon legal justification?
Answer: The introduction of  legal information systems has consequences for the
justification demands in the legal domain. If  technology enables us to raise stan-
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dards of  justification, those standards pretty quickly will be raised. It is our duty
(within reasonable limits) to deploy all means available to arrive at carefully
deliberated decisions. When we have the means to make decisions more reliably,
to review comparable cases, or to structure arguments for a certain case, then
we indeed have to do so. The use of  legal information systems introduces a
‘new’ source of  belief  and knowledge. Standards of  justification have to be
reconsidered for that source. For this reconsideration we can employ knowledge
criteria. We may assess how the relevant beliefs in the system, and the beliefs
held by its user, are susceptible to knowledge criteria.
Further conclusions
With respect to the object of  legal knowledge: One’s view on the nature of  legal knowl-
edge depends partly on one’s view on the object of  legal knowledge. Legal
knowledge, regarded as knowledge of  valid law, depends on the content of
positive law and the validity of  positive law. Knowledge of  the content and
validity of  positive law can be acquired through formal and material sources of
law. The object of  legal knowledge in this report is made dependent on conven-
tional rules and institutional rules. It may be claimed that such an ontology of
law is both related to a natural-law view (conventional rules may arise from
human nature) and to a legal-positivist view (institutional rules arise from recog-
nition by proper authorities).
With respect to the doxastic assumption: The doxastic assumption is rejected on the
grounds that justification does not depend on beliefs alone, as is clear from the
adoption of  the reliability criterion. Justification in legal information systems,
however, complies with the doxastic assumption, if we may regard the repre-
sentations in those systems as beliefs. In the evaluated systems, beliefs and the
way they are produced are made explicit, so that a justification attempt can be
made in terms of  beliefs.
With respect to the externalist assumption: Neither the internalist nor the externalist
assumption is employed on itself. Internalist and externalist criteria can be com-
bined in a concept of  knowledge. Legal information systems mainly have an
influence on the internalist criterion of  justification proper. However, they could
be employed for the fulfilment of  the externalist criterion of  reliability as well.
With respect to the relevance of  epistemic evaluation: Epistemic evaluation of  legal
information systems can help to clarify the functions of  those systems. But it is
only one of  the perspectives that can be chosen. Systems like LEDA apparently
are hard to evaluate from this framework, because we can hardly construe their
contents as beliefs. Still, we can evaluate the beliefs represented in the systems,
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and beliefs formed by their users, by employing epistemic standards. These
epistemic standards may also function as guiding principles for building new
information systems.
8.3 Further research
In this report, focus was on a concept of  knowledge in the legal domain, and its
relations to legal information systems. More research on the nature of  knowl-
edge criteria in the legal domain would be worthwhile. First, the criteria dis-
cussed invoke some questions. With respect to truth: does truth play a role in
the assumptions of  the builders of  legal information systems? With respect to
justification: a lot of  work on this criterion is done from a theoretical viewpoint.
Could we examine justification from the viewpoint of  positive law: how are
decisions justified in civil law and in penal law? With respect to reliability: can
we give a more extensive account of  the reliability criterion for practices?
The employment of  a typology of  knowledge in the legal domain raises ques-
tions about its applicability. Are all relevant distinctions employed? Can this
typology of  knowledge, along with applicable knowledge criteria, be used to
develop an epistemic logic for knowledge representation purposes? And finally,
how can such a logic be used to model the actual procedures found in the legal
domain?
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